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Abstract An extensive radiation risk estimation methodology has recently been
developed in Russia and used for estimates of risk in exposed populations in the
republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Results based on demographic data for
the three republics are presented and compared with risk estimates from the EU
risk model ASQRAD.
The intervention criteria in the CIS republics have been evolving since the Cher-
nobyl accident. The development of criteria in each of the three republics has been
analyzed and the CIS-criteria have been compared to international guidance on
intervention.
After a nuclear or radiological emergency both radiological and non-radiological
protection factors will inﬂuence the level of protective actions being introduced.
The role of non-radiological protection factors in the overall optimization of health
protection is addressed. It is argued that optimization of the overall health pro-
tection is not a question of developing radiation protection philosophy to fully
include socio-psychological factors. It is rather a question of including these fac-
tors - in parallel with the radiological protection factors - in cooperation between
radiation protection experts and psychological specialists under the responsibility
of the decision maker.
This work has been performed as a part of the EU/CIS Joint Study Project 2,
“Development and Application of Techniques to Assist in the Establishment of
Intervention Levels for the Introduction of Countermeasures in the Event of an
Accident”.
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Foreword
The Chernobyl Centre for International Research (CHECIR) has been established
by the former Soviet Union “for the purpose of conducting research programmes
to be concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis in the area of nuclear safety”.
The EU-CIS bilateral research projects within the CHECIR programme for 1995
cover several Experimental Co-operative Projects (ECPs) and Joint Study Projects
(JSPs).
The Joint Study Project 2 (JSP 2) has been subdivided in 1995 into the following
tasks:
• investigation of social and psychological factors,
• indirect countermeasures,
• interactions between countermeasures, socio-psychological factors and doses,
and
• conceptual basis for developing criteria for setting intervention levels.
In the fourth project year the work on conceptual basis for developing intervention
criteria has concentrated on the following subjects:
• radiation risk assessment methodology developed in CIS,
• comparison between CIS and EU radiation risk assessments,
• analysis of intervention concepts in CIS in the period 1983-1995, and
• evaluation of the role of non-radiological protection factors in the optimization
of overall health protection.
This report describes the work performed during the fourth and ﬁnal year car-
ried out by the CIS-partners from the Ukrainian Research Centre for Radiation
Medicine in Kiev, Ukraine, the Chernobyl State Committee in Minsk, Belarus,
the Institute of Radiation Hygiene in St. Petersburg, Russia, the Russian Re-
search Centre “Kurchatov Institute” in Moscow, Russia, and the EU-partners from
CEPN in Paris, France and Risø National Laboratory in Roskilde, Denmark.
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1 Introduction
In the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency resulting in the disper-
sion of radioactive materials into the environment, the eﬀective implementation
of measures for protection of the public will largely be dependent upon the ade-
quacy of advance preparation, including the preparation of an emergency response
plan to control and limit the consequences of the accident. Important parts of
the plan will be emergency procedures including intervention and action levels for
protective measures and instrumentation and manpower requirements for accident
assessment, protective measures and communication.
Radiological emergency assessment and response require an interdisciplinary
approach. The procedures leading to decision making must ensure that all due
weight and consideration are given to each specialized aspect of the wide ranging
problems following a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. At each major
decision point, the decision maker must consider the facts as they have been
determined at the time. Having determined, from dose projections for individuals,
that protective actions are needed, the decision maker must then consider the risks
and social costs associated with implementing a protective measure.
The decision maker will have to contend with economic and political constraints
on the resources with which to implement the recovery plans and on the accept-
ability and credibility of priorities and criteria for recovery. The recommendations
of specialized advisers are also ‘decisions’ in the sense that they represent assess-
ment of what the situation call for, albeit from specialized or limited viewpoint.
However, many constraints and competing ‘decisions’ will have to be weighed and
balanced to arrive at a ﬁnal decision which leads to the best way to protect public
health and safety and to assist the long term recovery process.
Some major deleterious impacts of a nuclear or radiological emergency cannot
be quantiﬁed in terms of radiological dose although they may be regarded as com-
ponents of the detriment related to the accident. They are eﬀects such as anxiety
about the situation in general or about the threat of radiation exposure (gen-
erally related to the risk perceived), together with discomfort or inconvenience
caused by protective measures. In decision making on protective measures there
will be several objectives, of varying degree of importance. While the main ob-
jective, namely dose reduction, is the same during the earlier and later phases of
an accident, competing requirements and constraints are likely to become much
more prominent in the later stages.
Following the accident at Chernobyl, it became evident that some clariﬁcation
of the basic principles for intervention was warranted. During the last decade, radi-
ation protection criteria for protective measures following a nuclear accident have
thus been developed by the international radiation protection organisations. This
process has created a lot of confusion because intervention levels for introducing
countermeasures have been interpreted as doses received and not as doses averted
which wrongly has been interpreted as if intervention levels were dose limits.
The recent development of intervention principles by the IAEA [21], ICRP [29]
and NEA [39] are based on the justiﬁcation and optimisation principles, namely
that each countermeasure should be justiﬁed, i.e., do more good than harm, and
the level of the protective measure should be optimised, i.e., do the most good.
Each countermeasure should be optimised separately, independent of other coun-
termeasures.
Avertable doses from protective measures can be expressed in terms of avertable
individual risks or avertable expected consequences, eg, avertable collective years
of life lost, in the aﬀected population. When countermeasures are not implemented
because the avertable doses will be less than the intervention level or when coun-
termeasures are lifted, the residual doses can similarly be expressed as lifetime
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risks from the residual lifetime exposure of the diﬀerent age groups in the popu-
lation. The residual individual risk of stochastic eﬀects after protective measures
have been taken is often a signiﬁcant concern to national authorities. For decision-
making on the introduction of countermeasures and social protection it is therefore
necessary to assess both avertable and residual risks.
A radiation dose will involve a risk commitment, i.e., a commitment of an in-
creased cancer death probability rate in the future, after a latent period which may
be from a few years in the case of leukaemia to tens of years for other malignant
conditions. Any change in the age-speciﬁc death probability rate would therefore
occur later in life, when the risk of death from their causes is also higher.
Individual risk considerations can be directly incorporated into the setting of
intervention levels which could be expressed in avertable individual risk of radia-
tion induced cancer. The basis for estimating individual risk levels is thus a very
important issue in decision making following a nuclear accident.
A number of computerized systems for quantiﬁcation of radiation risks have
been developed on the basis of general risk assessment methodology and radiation
risk models produced by international and national organisations. Examples on
such systems developed within CIS and EU are BARD [5] and ASQRAD [2]. Their
aim is to provide a ﬂexible, easy-to-use tool to quantify somatic and hereditary
risks due to both short-term and prolonged radiation exposure.
2 Risk Quantifications
2.1 Computer system BARD
Since 1994 in the framework of the Russian federal research programme, the
international (EU - CIS) post-Chernobyl project JSP2 and partly the IAEA
Coordinated Research Programme “Comparative Health and Environmental
Risks of Nuclear and Other Energy Systems” the research project developing the
methodology (MAR) and data bank (BARD) on health risk analysis has been car-
ried out [12].
The main applications of BARD are:
• assessment of the radiological and non-radiological consequences of nuclear
tests and accidents,
• assessment of radiation risk due to any source of exposure,
• health risk assessment and comparison for diﬀerent energy production sys-
tems,
• assessment of the health of a population in terms of risk indices (indicators),
• analysis of eﬀectiveness of health protection measures.
Besides BARD can also be used for other tasks related to risk analysis. BARD
includes:
• service and calculation codes realizing the methodology mentioned,
• the intrinsic data base with the health-demographic data (HDD) for many
regions and years which are necessary for radiation and non-radiation risks
assessment.
HDD have been prepared for population of many regions of Russia for diﬀerent
years, for some regions of CIS and some countries around the world. The sources
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of these data are the health-demographic State Statistics of FUSSR and Russia,
the health-demographic WHO statistics, etc.
The BARD data base contains the following HDD for any concrete population:
• age distribution density,
• age-cause-speciﬁc morbidity rates (under development),
• age-speciﬁc fertility rates (under development),
• age-cause-speciﬁc death rates.
The last HDD are given in two modiﬁcations:
• aggregated form,
• detailed form.
In the aggregated form all health risk causes are divided into 8 combined groups:
• infection and parasite diseases,
• malignant neoplasms,
• circulatory system diseases,
• respiratory system diseases,
• digestive system diseases,
• accidents and adverse eﬀects,
• other diseases,
• all risk causes.
In the detailed form each aggregated group is sub-divided into more speciﬁc sub-
groups. Detailed subgroups for the malignant neoplasms include:
• leukaemia,
• respiratory cancer (lung, bronchus, . . . ),
• breast cancer,
• digestive cancer (stomach, colon, rectum, . . . ),
• others (liver, urinary tract, . . . ).
In CIS and Russia HDD are prepared for population of: a state, a region, a city,
a settlement or some other speciﬁc cohorts.
Any array of HDD is additionally subdivided into subgroups:
• male, female, both sexes,
• urban, rural or total population.
The calculation codes have been prepared on the basis of methodology of risk
assessment being developed in parallel with BARD.
In radiation risk assessment part of BARD the following models were imple-
mented:
• UNSCEAR-94,
• BEIR V,
• UK NRPB.
Input data for BARD are divided in two parts:
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• external (prepared and supplied from outside BARD),
• internal (taken from the intrinsic HDD data base and prepared inside BARD).
For a radiation risk assessment external input data are values of absorbed or equiv-
alent doses (short-term exposure) and dose rates (extended exposure) of diﬀerent
human body organs due to radiation exposure from a source considered. These
doses or (and) dose rates should be given in their dependence on age, time at
exposure, countermeasures adopted etc.
For non-radiation risk assessment input data can be age-cause-speciﬁc death or
disease rates or some variations of the background HDD prepared using the data
from the internal data base.
Output data of BARD in accordance with MAR are values of diﬀerent risk
indices on cohort (individual) and population levels:
• lifetime risk (a probability of death or a disease from a risk source considered)
during the whole future life or the respective risk rate,
• detriment to human health due to some death cause (deﬁned as a loss of life
expectancy in man-years) on the cohort (individual) or population levels,
• mortality or morbidity due to a risk cause in a some cohort with speciﬁc age
and sex composition or in a total population considered during some limited
time interval (eg 1 year) or remaining lifetime of that population.
All these risk indices are determined in MAR.
Risk indices calculated can be given in their possible dependence on age, sex,
local conditions, time etc. or in an average form.
These forms of output data are specialized by a task for calculation and can be
determined in input data or from a computer screen.
Dependence of the risk indices on any protective measures is determined through
the input data (variations of doses, other risk causes characteristics due to these
measures).
BARD is constantly supported and developed in the two versions (local and
distributed, accessible through Internet) at RRC “Kurchatov Institute” (Moscow,
Russia) with participation of other organizations. To the end of 1995 the data
base of BARD includes HDD for more than 200 diﬀerent cohorts in aggregate or
detailed forms and in diﬀerent years for:
• Total FUSSR,
• Belarus (few),
• Ukraine (few),
• Russia (many cohorts for the total state and diﬀerent regions including those
suﬀered from the Chernobyl accident),
• some other UN states (France, UK, USA, ...).
Some simple demonstrative distributed version of BARD can be already accessible
through Internet (http://nsi.net.kiae.su/).
The BARD risk assessment methodology is described in details in Appendix A.
2.2 Computer system ASQRAD
The risk calculation program ASQRAD (Assessment System for the
Quantiﬁcation of RAdiation Detriment) is a Windows based tool for PCs. It has
been jointly developed by the CEPN (Centre d’etude sur l’evaluation de la protec-
tion dans le domaine nucleaire) in France and the NRPB (National Radiological
Protection Board) in the UK with support from the European Commission [2].
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The aim of ASQRAD is to provide a common framework for applying measures
of radiation detriment. The code has been designed to be a ﬂexible, easy-to-use
tool with the facility to quantify somatic and hereditary eﬀects, based on a wide
selection of health eﬀect models for both individuals and populations. It contains
a data base from a wide selection of countries, but it also allows the user to input
alternative data and model parameters.
A range of somatic eﬀects models is available within the program. These are the
multiplicative and additive models proposed by the UNSCEAR (United Nations
Scientiﬁc Committee on the Eﬀects of Atomic Radiation) in its 1988 [42] and 1994
[43] reports, the RERF (Radiation Eﬀects Research Foundation), the US BEIR
V Committee [44] and by the NRPB in its 1993 report. A model developed by the
ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) and detailed in its
Publication 60 [28] is also included within ASQRAD to quantify the hereditary
eﬀects of an exposure to ionising radiation. The program allows the user to the
parameter values of all these models.
ASQRAD is able to perform four main types of detriment calculation, based
on diﬀerent combinations of individual or population exposure and somatic or
hereditary eﬀects as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Calculation mode with the ASQRAD model.
Calculations Exposure type Exposure duration Age at exposure
available (acute exposure only)
Individual Whole body or Acute or Single or
Somatic Organ Speciﬁc Extended Multiple
Population Whole body or Acute n/a
Somatic Organ Speciﬁc
Individual Gonads Acute or Single or
Hereditary Extended Multiple
Population Gonads Acute n/a
Hereditary
ASQRAD provides various measures of detriment depending on the type of cal-
culation being performed.
For somatic eﬀects the measures of detriment provided are the number of fatal
cancers, the total cancer incidence and the average loss of life expectancy. In
addition to these, a number of intermediate measures that are derived during the
process obtaining the main measures are made available to the user.
For hereditary eﬀects the main measure of detriment provided is the probability
of an eﬀects in the subsequent generations. The distribution of these eﬀects over
the ﬁrst to the tenth generations is provided for each category of hereditary eﬀects.
2.3 BARD risk calculations
Some results of health risk estimations have been made with BARD for the
Bryansk region territories with relatively high 137Cs-contamination from the Cher-
nobyl accident (> 30 Ci·km−2) in [19] (see also other results of BARD [1]). Here
some additional results for the same territory of the Bryansk region are presented
(Figs. 1 - 4).
The following input data were used for these estimations of the health risk with
BARD:
• health demographic data, HDD (the age-cause-speciﬁc death rates and the
age distribution density) for the rural population of the Bryansk region in
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1989,
• results of dose assessment for selected territories available from the Russian
Chernobyl research studies and the international EU-CIS Projects JSP2 and
JSP5.
All the present calculations were made with the primary radiation risk models
from BEIR V.
It should be emphasized that a considerable improvement in the Chernobyl dose
assessment methodology and results have been made in the last few years (1993 -
1995). The improvements can be characterized as:
• the calculations take into account more realistically dose and dose rate de-
pendence on time, local conditions and countermeasures,
• the calculated doses are considerably lower then the preliminary results of
the estimations made up to 1991 and analyzed in the International Chernobyl
project (1989-1991).
The following dose components are included in the risk assessment:
(a) short-term whole body dose during the ﬁrst few weeks (equivalent dose H0),
(b) thyroid dose (absorbed dose Dth),
(c) chronic whole body dose described by the equivalent dose rate H˙(t) with its
external and internal parts and their respective time dependence.
For the population and territory chosen H0 = 50 mSv (compared with 80 - 100
mSv from the estimations up to 1991), Dth = 0.3 Gy for adults with increasing
doses towards lower ages as described in [30] (2 and 4 times higher for children
with ages less than 18 and 7 years, respectively). Two variants of H˙(t) are used
here for the risk estimation:
(1) H˙(t) without any countermeasures (the internal doses are higher than the
external doses (1.5 times in 1990)),
(2) H˙(t), which have been observed and predicted taking into account the coun-
termeasures adopted (the internal doses are considered lower than the external
doses (3 times lower in 1990)).
A strong dependence of the individual life time risk, R, with age at time of the
accident can be observed in Fig. 1 the value of R is relatively large for children
and juveniles and decreases fastly towards older ages. This dependence is similar
for all kinds of cancer except for respiratory cancer. For this type of cancer, the
risk is highest at ages 35 - 40 years. Such behaviour of R is well known from the
literature, eg, ICRP Publication 60 [28].
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Figure 1. Life time risk R from lethal radiogenic cancers, as a function of age at
the time of accident.
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Figure 2. Excess morbidity from radiogenic thyroid cancers (due to the Chernobyl
accident) per 100 000 persons at age 0 - 18 years at the time of accident, as a
function of time, t, after the accident.
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Figure 3. Annual mortality rate, M˙(t), from spontaneous and radiogenic cancers
(due to the Chernobyl accident) per 100 000 persons at age 0 - 18 years at the
time of accident as a function of time, t, after the accident.
The speciﬁc feature of Figs. 1 - 4 is that R and M˙(t) were calculated for the pop-
ulation of the Bryansk region with HDD as described above and for the mixed
exposure due to the Chernobyl accident (acute plus extended). The age depen-
dence of the radiation risk was taken into account when the above age groups
for the risk calculations were chosen. The predicted excess cases of most of the
radiation-induced cancers are rather low at any time after the accident, even with-
out countermeasures (see Fig. 3 and [19]): less then ten percent of the mortality
due to the respective spontaneous cancers. It is therefore not reasonable to plan
any epidemiological study to observe these health eﬀects from the Chernobyl ac-
cident.
However, the situation is diﬀerent for radiogenic thyroid cancer and leukaemia.
Values of M˙(t) for these types in the proper time intervals after the accident are
relatively high and can in principle be observed in an epidemiological study. This
is due to the relatively low occurrence of these spontaneous cancers and their
relatively high radiation risk coeﬃcients.
Many national and international studies are being carried out regarding the
thyroid cancers following the Chernobyl accident. A few hundreds of excess thyroid
cancer cases have already been observed in the regions of Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine aﬀected by the accident (see eg [30]). The risk assessment prediction for
the excess thyroid cancers (see Fig. 2) is in a reasonable agreement with the results
of the epidemiological studies in the Bryansk region. From 1987 to 1995 the total
of 48 cases of thyroid cancer were observed (for people of age 0 - 17 years at
the time of accident and with the male/female ratio close to 0.5) [19]. Few such
spontaneous cases could be observed for the same cohort and time interval (BARD
calculation based on the background HDD for the Bryansk region).
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Figure 4. Annual excess mortality rate, M˙(t), from radiogenic cancers (due to the
Chernobyl accident) per 100 000 persons at age 0 - 18 years at the time of accident
as a function of time, t, after the accident with and without countermeasures.
Regarding the radiogenic leukaemia no statistically reliable excess cases were ob-
served in studies up to 1994. The problem of the radiogenic leukaemia continues
to be under investigation, both in the epidemiological studies and for risk assess-
ments with radiation risk models available.
Peculiarities of excess health risk due to the radiogenic thyroid cancer, leukaemia
and other cancers should be taken into account in preparing and performing the
health protection and rehabilitation programme for the current and following years
in the territories aﬀected by the accident. The detailed risk assessment data can
here be a good basis for decision making for this application. It should be em-
phasized that in Russia the additional development of regulatory documents for
radioactively contaminated territories using the risk assessment results has already
begun.
It follows from the results that the total radiological health risk caused by the
Chernobyl accident is rather low (especially for the adult population) in compari-
son with the health risk from all spontaneous cancers even on the territories with
relatively high levels of radioactive contamination.
In the late 1980’s it was predicted that the socio-psychological factors can have
a considerable negative health eﬀects together with the radiation exposure itself
due to the accident [3]. In the 1990’s many results from studies of the population
health eﬀects in the territories aﬀected by the accident supported the correctness
of this prediction (eg [31]).
It is planned to estimate non-radiological health eﬀects with BARD using the
results of the socio-psychological studies carried out in the frame of Russian Fed-
eral Research Programme and the international EU-CIS Project JSP2. It is also
planned to carry out sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to make the risk estima-
tion results more complete and reliable.
The eﬀect of the radiation protection countermeasures adopted expressed in
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terms of avertable risk (see Fig. 4) and eﬀectiveness is as a rule rather low. It
could be considerably increased if also non-radiological protection were to be in-
cluded. Costs of the unit avertable risk (1 person·day lost) for the countermeasures
adopted are no less then 30 rubles (much more in the most cases). Cost values
of the proper medical health protection and rehabilitation measures are consider-
ably or many times lower (the eﬀectiveness is higher) in the speciﬁc condition of
CIS. It is true even for the territories with the highest levels of radioactive con-
tamination. Results of the study in this area are prepared for publication. Some
preliminary results can be found in [4].
To demonstrate non-radiation risk assessments with BARD the results of esti-
mation of lifetime risk, R, and loss of life expectancy, G, of the total population
of France and Russia are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. Lifetime risk R and loss of life expectancy G due to diﬀerent background
risk sources (France, 1987; calculation with BARD).
Risk source G, man-years R
male female male female
Infection and par. diseases 0.1 0.2 0.01 0.01
Malignant neoplasms 5.2 3.6 0.31 0.21
Circulatory system diseases 5.3 7.5 0.33 0.41
Respiratory system diseases 0.7 0.6 0.07 0.05
Digestive system diseases 0.8 0.7 0.05 0.05
Accidents and adverse eﬀects 2.1 1.2 0.08 0.07
Other diseases 2.8 3.3 0.15 0.20
Life expectancy, years 74.8 83.7 - -
Table 3. Lifetime risk R and loss of life expectancy G due to diﬀerent background
risk sources (Russia, 1989; calculation with BARD).
Risk source G, man-years R
male female male female
Infection and par. diseases 0.4 0.2 0.01 0.01
Malignant neoplasms 2.7 2.1 0.20 0.13
Circulatory system diseases 13.2 33.9 0.51 0.72
Respiratory system diseases 1.0 0.6 0.07 0.04
Digestive system diseases 0.3 0.3 0.03 0.02
Accidents and adverse eﬀects 3.9 1.2 0.13 0.04
Other diseases 1.6 1.4 0.05 0.04
Life expectancy, years 65.3 75.3 - -
2.4 Comparison between ASQRAD and BARD calculations
Both computer systems ASQRAD and BARD on their current stage of develop-
ment are rather large and complicated. They content data bases and their man-
agement, calculation codes for all possible modes of radiation exposure and risk
indices, management systems of preparing input and output data etc. ASQRAD
and BARD need to be proved in all their parts, including ﬁrst of all the calcu-
lation codes. It is obvious that the authors of the systems continually make such
approval in the process of developing the systems.
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Table 4. Values of radiation risk indices, R, and g = G/R (where G is the detri-
ment index) for diﬀerent cancer type (or localization) as a result of calculation
with BARD/ASQRAD (single whole body exposure, D = 0.1 Sv, dose and dose
rate reduction factor DDREF = 1, a is the age at exposure).
a, years lung breast leukaemia digestive other
R · 100, 000
male
0 85/84 160/170 560/550 300/300
20 160/160 24/23 570/580 190/180
50 310/450 72/80 56/65 36/38
female
0 23/23 58/58 95/100 620/650 350/370
20 40/43 39/37 19/18 630/670 220/220
50 77/100 5.6/5.6 42/46 64/76 33/38
g, years
male
0 16/16 54/55 14/14 15/15
20 16/17 31/30 14/14 13/14
50 11/12 12/13 9/10 9/10
female
0 19/21 30/32 63/67 14/16 18/20
20 19/22 26/28 38/39 14/16 17/19
50 11/15 11/13 14/17 9/12 9/13
Table 5. Values of radiation risk indices, R and g = G/R (where G is the detriment
index) for diﬀerent cancer types (or localizations) as a result of calculation with
BARD/ASQRAD (chronic whole body exposure, D = 0.001 Sv/year, dose and
dose rate reduction factor DDREF = 1, a is the age at the beginning of exposure).
a, years lung breast leukaemia digestive other
R · 100, 000
male
0 120/145 43/42 175/174 83/83
20 96/130 20/19 66/67 30/31
50 28/51 10/10 5/7 3/3
female
0 32/42 24/24 32/30 200/210 100/101
20 26/37 6/6 14/14 75/82 34/37
50 9/16 0.3/0.4 5/6 6/10 3/4
g, years
male
0 14/14 32/33 13/14 13/14
20 13/14 15/15 13/13 12/12
50 9/10 10/10 8/8 8/8
female
0 14/16 27/29 39/41 13/15 16/18
20 13/16 20/23 18/20 12/15 14/16
50 7/11 8/11 10/13 7/10 7/10
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Since 1995 cross comparison of results of ASQRAD and BARD began. It can be
considered as an additional test. At the same time this cross comparison has a
speciﬁc importance for an oﬃcial approval of the systems in cases of their practical
applications. In this section some examples of such cross comparison are given.
All calculations for this section were made using the HDD for rural population
of Russia in 1989 (taken from the BARD data base) and the primary risk model
from BEIR V.
Good or reasonable agreements between results from both computer systems
for the variants considered are observed in Tables 4 and 5.
3 Intervention after a Nuclear or Radio-
logical Emergency
The health consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency include more than
the increased risk of stochastic radiation eﬀects attributable to the emergency.
Diﬀerent causes can lead to increases in psychological strain in the aﬀected popu-
lation, and there will be mental distress and anxiety associated with any accident,
regardless of whether an actual radiation dose has been received or not. This is
attributable to the perception of a risk to health, and depends in part on whether
people have conﬁdence that the authorities are competent and trustworthy and
have taken prompt and eﬀective action to control radiation doses.
3.1 Purpose of intervention
In the event of an accident, doses to individuals in the aﬀected population can only
be reduced by intervention, i.e., through the imposition of protective measures,
which will normally inconvenience people and alter their environment. These mea-
sures may include sheltering, evacuation, administration of stable iodine tablets,
banning of contaminated food, modiﬁcation of agricultural and industrial pro-
cesses, decontamination measures, temporary relocation or permanent resettle-
ment of the population.
Such measures are not without their own harmful eﬀects: some have direct
implications for health and well-being; they all require restrictions on people’s
freedom of action or choice; and resources may have to be diverted from other
socially beneﬁcial purposes to pay for them. Therefore, in selecting the level above
which a given protective measure should be taken, a balance needs to be struck
between the beneﬁts of the measure, in terms of reducing the risk to health from
radiation, and the harm from the measure itself.
When faced with a need for intervention, every possible eﬀort should be made
to prevent anyone receiving doses above the thresholds for serious deterministic
eﬀects. Indeed, because there will necessarily be uncertainties in the prediction of
doses received, all doses should be kept somewhat below the threshold to ensure
that no one suﬀers a serious deterministic health eﬀect.
Stochastic eﬀects typically include a wide range of cancers and hereditary ef-
fects, which may not occur until many years after the initial exposure. For a large
population, all receiving small radiation doses, it is possible to estimate statisti-
cally the expected number of extra stochastic eﬀects that would occur. However,
since other causes not related to radiation can give rise to similar eﬀects, it is im-
possible to distinguish with certainty which of the individuals suﬀering the eﬀects
do so as a direct result of the radiation exposure.
The health consequences of a nuclear accident would include those not related
to radiation doses, eg, psychological strain and anxiety. Protective measures might
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thus be introduced to mitigate such consequences thereby improving the overall
health conditions in the aﬀected population. Such protective measures may have
no inﬂuence on the radiological situation at all, or they might even result in an
increase in doses. If, however, the reduction of non-radiological health impact is
greater than the increase in radiological health impact, the measures would have
a positive net beneﬁt and thus be justiﬁed on an overall health ground.
The quantiﬁcation of non-radiological health risks is not an easy task and the
comparison and trade-oﬀ between radiological and non-radiological health conse-
quences is, therefore, extremely diﬃcult.
3.2 Radiological and non-radiological protection factors
The principles of justiﬁcation/optimization of intervention each require consider-
ation of the beneﬁt that would be achieved by the intervention and the harm, in
its broadest sense, that would also result from it. They therefore require the use
of the procedures for reaching decisions. The inputs to justiﬁcation and optimiza-
tion studies include factors that are related to radiological protection, whereas the
ﬁnal decisions may also depend on other factors, probably of a political nature
[24, 27].
3.2.1 Radiological protection factors
Radiological protection factors are deﬁned as those which are related to the level
of radiological protection achieved. Thus they include those factors describing the
dose distribution averted and those describing the costs and other disadvantages
incurred in averting the doses. All these techniques have as their primary objective
to clarify, for the people who have to decide on the intervention, the various factors,
to quantify them if this is reasonable and necessary, and to systematize the trade
oﬀs between the various factors.
Factors which would clearly be radiological protection factors are:
• the averted individual and collective risks for the members of the public,
• the individual and collective physical risks to the public caused by the coun-
termeasure,
• the individual and collective risks to the workers in carrying out the counter-
measure, and
• the monetary cost of the countermeasure.
The factors include those describing beneﬁts from the countermeasure and those
describing harm. In analyzing the inputs to the decision, it is necessary to decide
on the relative importance of each factor. These judgements have to be applied
irrespective of the decision aiding technique used. The resultant decision is the
same provided that the database is the same and the judgements are consistent.
If multiattribute utility analysis is the technique used, then all the radiological
protection factors can be directly included in the analysis by deriving or assigning
utility functions to them, and the tradeoﬀ judgements are expressed as scaling
constants. If cost-beneﬁt analysis is the technique, then those factors convertible
into ﬁnancial equivalents can be included in the quantitative analysis, but other
factors should be considered in a qualitative manner in reaching a decision.
However, in a complete analysis each of the factors have to be expressed in the
same units. These units can be dimensionless quantities (such as used in multi-
attribute utility analysis), or values could be expressed in equivalent years of life
lost. Conventionally in cost-beneﬁt approaches values are expressed in monetary
units. However, it is the relative values placed on the components and their weight-
ing one to another that is important, rather than the absolute unit in which they
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are quoted. Indeed, whatever unit is used can normally be readily converted to
other units, such as equivalent years of life lost or utilities.
3.2.2 Non-radiological protection factors
Non-radiological protection factors are deﬁned as those which are not related to
the level of radiological protection achieved by protective measures. It is very
diﬃcult to generalize about these factors, although they can have an important
or even overriding inﬂuence on the decisions taken.
Most intervention is disruptive to normal social and economic life. Change may
cause anxiety, which can be harmful to health and well-being. However, the ab-
sence of protective measures can also cause anxiety, which is often exacerbated by
a lack of objective information. These eﬀects are non-radiological, are not easily
quantiﬁable, will vary markedly between countries, and in any case will normally
have opposing inﬂuences on the choices of intervention levels. They include the
following factors:
• the perception of the hazard posed by the radiation from environmental dis-
persed radioactive materials,
• psychological impacts,
• the reassurance provided by the implementation of the countermeasure,
• the anxiety caused by its implementation,
• the individual and social disruption resulting from its implementation, and
• political considerations.
Although some of these factors to a certain extent are related to the level of pro-
tection achieved they are all considered to be non-radiological protection factors.
The political input, however, is always deemed to include only non-radiological
protection factors.
3.3 Decision making on protective measures
The overall health protection of people after an accident should be based on an
optimized countermeasure strategy, which would include not only radiation pro-
tection factors but also other factors of political, psychological and social nature.
This overall optimization of the total health protection is the responsibility of the
decision maker(s) with guidance from radiation protection experts as well as ex-
perts in the ﬁelds of social and psychological sciences. The inclusion of these other
factors in an overall optimization of health protection after an accident is thus
a discipline for decision makers rather than being an extension of the radiation
protection philosophy.
3.3.1 Justiﬁcation and optimization of radiation protection
In existing exposure situations, i.e., existing at the time when control procedures
are being considered, the choice of action is limited. The most eﬀective action,
that applied at the source, is rarely available and controls have to be applied in
the form of intervention. The system of radiological protection for intervention is
based on the following general principles:
(a) The proposed intervention should do more good than harm, i.e. the reduction
in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be suﬃcient to justify
the harm and the costs, including social costs, of the intervention (justiﬁcation
of intervention).
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(b) The form, scale, and duration of the intervention should be optimised so that
the net beneﬁt of the reduction of dose, i.e. the beneﬁt of the reduction in ra-
diation detriment, less the detriment associated with the intervention, should
be maximised (optimization of intervention protection).
Dose limits do not apply in the case of intervention. The process of justiﬁcation
and optimisation both apply to the protective action.
Justiﬁcation is the process of deciding that the disadvantages of each component
of intervention, i.e., of each protective action or, in the case of accidents, each
countermeasure, are more than oﬀset by the reductions in the dose likely to be
achieved. The application of the justiﬁcation principle is illustrated in Appendix
B for clean-up of contaminated urban areas.
Optimisation is the process of deciding on the method, scale and duration of the
action so as to obtain the maximum net beneﬁt. In simple terms, the diﬀerence
between the disadvantages and the beneﬁts, expressed in the same terms, eg,
monetary terms, should be positive for each countermeasure adopted and should
be maximized by setting the details of that countermeasure.
The cost of intervention is not just the monetary cost. Some remedial actions
may involve non-radiological risks or serious social impacts. For example, the
short-term removal of people from their homes is not very expensive, but it may
cause the temporary separation of members of a family and result in considerable
anxiety. Prolonged evacuation and permanent relocation are both expensive and
traumatic.
The beneﬁt of a particular countermeasure within a programme of interven-
tion should be judged on the basis of the reduction in dose achieved or expected
by that special countermeasure, the avertable dose. If the total dose to some in-
dividuals is so high as to be unacceptable in any circumstances, eg, doses causing
serious deterministic eﬀects or a very high probability of stochastic eﬀects, the
feasibility of additional countermeasures inﬂuencing the major contributions to
the total dose should be urgently reviewed.
(a) Application of optimization principle
The optimized protection against radiation induced stochastic health eﬀects in
an intervention situation would - according to the recommendations from the
international radiation protection organisations ICRP [29] and IAEA [21] - include
the avertable dose and the monetary costs of the achieved dose reduction.
A simpliﬁed optimization of radiation protection in terms of avertable dose
and monetary costs of the protective measure is elaborated below to illustrate
the methodology. In Section 3.3.2 the methodology is expanded to illustrate that
the optimization of overall health protection should include both radiological and
non-radiological protection factors at the same time to avoid a sub-optimized
radiological and non-radiological protection.
If the eﬀective dose accumulating per unit time without any protective action
is E˙(t), then the avertable dose during the time period τ = t2 − t1 during which
the countermeasure is in action would be:
ΔE(τ) =
∫ t1+τ
t1
E˙(t) dt
= E(t1 + τ)− E(t1) (1)
It is assumed here that the countermeasure is 100% eﬀective during time τ .
The monetary costs of the countermeasure during the time period τ can be
expressed as the sum of a ﬁxed cost component, C0, and a time running cost
component, c:
C(τ) = C0 + c τ (2)
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The net beneﬁt of the protective action, B, is the diﬀerence between the equivalent
monetary cost of the doses averted by the protective action and the monetary costs
of that action:
B(τ) = α [E(t1 + τ) − E(t1)]− [C0 + c τ ] (3)
where α is the equivalent monetary value of avoiding a unit radiation dose.
The optimized level of protection is achieved when the protective action is in-
troduced at time t1 and suspended after having been in action for a time period,
τ . The maximum net beneﬁt can be found from:
dB(τ)
dτ
= α E˙(t1 + τ)− c = 0 (4)
The intervention level for countermeasure suspension when only radiation protec-
tion factors are taken into consideration is thus given as:
ILrad = E˙(t1 + τ) =
c
α
(5)
The cost parameters c and α are likely to be correlated to national wealth and
thus susceptible to a relatively large variation between countries. However, the
ratio c/α would in general be much less sensitive to geographical location than
either the value of c and α alone.
The concepts of Intervention Level, Operational Intervention Level and Action
Level are summarized below.
(b) Intervention Level (IL)
Intervention level refer to the dose that is expected to be averted (avertable dose)
by a speciﬁc countermeasure over the period it is in eﬀect. If an intervention
level is exceeded, i.e., if the expected avertable individual dose is greater than the
intervention level, then it is indicated that the speciﬁc protective action is likely
to be appropriate for that situation. Intervention levels are speciﬁc to accident
situations. The intervention level can be deﬁned as follows [20]:
Intervention level is the level of avertable dose at
which a speciﬁc protective action or remedial action
is taken in an emergency exposure situation or a
chronic exposure situation
The intervention level for a speciﬁc countermeasure can be determined from op-
timization as indicated above. The outcome of an optimization for a protective
action continuing over a prolonged time period would be the intervention level for
lifting the countermeasure as well as the time interval over which it would be in
action. The concept of an intervention level is illustrated in Fig. 5 [21].
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intervention almost
always justified
further intervention not justified
intervention not justified
Figure 5. Concept of intervention level. Intervention is always justiﬁed for the
inner area. This area can delineate a population to be evacuated, the amount of
foodstuﬀs to be banned etc. In the optimization process this area will be enlarged
until the marginal increase in avertable doses becomes just less valuable than the
increased marginal costs. The optimized intervention level therefore corresponds to
the diﬀerential dose saving at the border between intervention and non-intervention
areas.
The Intervention Level is speciﬁed in terms of the dose that is anticipated to be
averted by the associated protective action and ILs are speciﬁed separately for
diﬀerent protective actions. If an IL for a speciﬁc protective action is anticipated
to be exceeded, i.e., if the expected avertable individual dose is greater than the
IL, it is then indicated that the protective action is likely to be appropriate for
that situation. The avertable doses would therefore need to be at least equal to
the IL.
The practical interpretation of an IL will therefore be the dividing line between
areas in which intervention is not justiﬁed and areas in which intervention is jus-
tiﬁed and by which the resulting avertable doses ranges from the IL and - at least
in theory - to inﬁnity (see Fig. 5). Strictly speaking, intervention may happen to
be only at the edge of being justiﬁed in the inner areas if the upper boundary of
the range is so close to the intervention level that some initial, non-incremental
costs may need to be considered.
(c) Operational Intervention Level (OIL)
Because of the inherent diﬃculty of forecasting doses that could be averted, there
is a merit in establishing surrogate quantities derived from the intervention level.
The relationship between these quantities and the avertable dose will vary con-
siderably with the circumstances of the accident and nature of contamination.
The operational quantities would, therefore, be both accident and site speciﬁc,
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depending on types of radionuclides, environmental half-lives, transfer factors of
deposited activity, location factors and ﬁltering factors for housing conditions, etc.
However, OILs would still be related to the avertable dose.
Operational intervention levels are expressed in quantities that can be more
easily assessed at the time of decision on intervention such as dose rate, activity
concentration, surface contamination density, etc. OILs are related to the dose
that could be averted by a speciﬁc countermeasures like evacuation, relocation
and banning of foodstuﬀs.
(d) Action Level (AL)
Action level refer to diﬀerent protective measures or strategies like agricultural
countermeasures or radon reducing measures in houses and they relate to the
residual dose without any remedial actions taken. The action level can be deﬁned
as follows [20]:
Action level is the level of dose rate or activity con-
centration above which remedial actions or protective
actions should be carried out in chronic or emergency
exposure situations
Action levels are levels above which remedial actions are taken and below which
they are not. An action level is set such that the dose averted by taking the
remedial action is always worthwhile in terms of the costs and other disadvantages
involved. Justiﬁed action levels would begin at the minimum value of the avertable
individual dose at which the remedial action is just beginning to do more good
than harm.
The action level can thus be deﬁned as the lowest level at which remedial actions
to reduce doses are justiﬁed and optimized. The equivalent deﬁnition would be
that the action level is equal to the maximum acceptable level of dose attributable
to the contamination without any protective actions taken. If an action level is
exceeded, it is indicated that some form of remedial action speciﬁc to the situation
considered is likely to be appropriate. An action levels has, therefore, the same
character as an operational intervention level.
The concept of an action level/operational intervention level is illustrated in
Fig. 6.
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Figure 6. Concept of an Action Level/Operational Intervention Level. This opera-
tional quantity corresponds to the maximum acceptable residual dose without any
remedial action which is equivalent to the minimum avertable dose by the remedial
action.
3.3.2 Justiﬁcation and optimization of health protection
Socio-political and psychological factors indeed may well contribute to, or even
dominate, decisions on countermeasures. The competent authorities responsible
for radiation protection should therefore be prepared to provide the radiation
protection input (justiﬁcation and optimization of the proposed protective actions
on radiological grounds) to the decision making process in a systematic manner,
indicating all the radiological protection factors already considered in the analysis
of the protection strategy. In the decision process the radiological protection and
the socio-political, psychological factors and political factors should each be taken
into account only once to avoid the same political factors being introduced in
several places.
Radiological protection factors have been used in developing international nu-
merical guidance on intervention levels for implementing countermeasures to re-
duce doses after a nuclear or radiological emergency, but explicit guidance is not
provided on how psychological and social factors should be included in the op-
timization of overall health protection. However, the optimization of radiation
protection and certain psychological and social protection should probably not
be carried out independently as separate and independent entities, as the overall
health protection would depend on both radiological and non-radiological protec-
tion factors.
The overall health consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency include
the increased stochastic risks directly attributable to the accident. They also in-
clude the perception of the hazard posed by radioactive materials dispersed in the
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environment and enforced changes of lifestyle which lead to increases in psycho-
logical strain in the aﬀected population. Such increases may in turn lead directly
or indirectly to increased illness.
In situations where a dose-reducing countermeasure has already been imple-
mented, and has been found to create so much strain that a net harm has been
the result, i.e., the psychological harm introduced by the countermeasure more
than oﬀsets the beneﬁt of the dose reductions, it may be optimal not to reduce
doses, or even increase doses, in order to reduce the strain and so provide an
overall net beneﬁt. For example, some relocation strategies in the former USSR
moved people to areas of high radon dose such that their total annual radiation
exposure after the countermeasure was greater than if they had remained in the
contaminated areas. Such a strategy may result in improved overall health due to
a reduction in perceived risk or due to the psychological beneﬁt from the counter-
measure that would more than oﬀset the increased radiation risk.
The optimization of an overall health protection in which both radiological and
non-radiological protection factors are included at the same time is shown above
in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7. Optimization of overall health protection based on radiological and non-
radiological protection factors after a radiological or nuclear emergency.
The independent optimization of radiological and non-radiological factors where
the results of the two procedures are combined to arrive at a sub-optimum course
of action is shown below in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8. Optimization of radiation protection and non-radiation protection re-
sulting in a sub-optimized overall health protection after a radiological or nuclear
emergency.
The optimization of overall health protection would include non-radiological pro-
tection factors like psychological and other less tangible factors. For illustrative
purposes it is postulated here that the psychological harm introduced by counter-
measures is proportional to the residual dose remaining when the countermeasures
are suspended at time t1 + τ . The residual dose, ER, can be expressed as:
ER(t1 + τ) =
∫ ∞
t1+τ
E˙(t) dt
= Etotal − E(t1 + τ) (6)
where Etotal is the total dose from the start of the accident without any counter-
measures.
The risk of psychological harm per unit residual dose is here assumed to be
a constant, i.e. the larger the residual dose the larger the psychological harm in
the aﬀected population. The equivalent monetary cost of avoiding a unit residual
dose to avoid psychological induced health eﬀects is here called β. The net beneﬁt
of introducing countermeasures that in addition to reduce radiation doses also
reduce psychological induced health eﬀects due to the residual dose can be found
by expanding Eq. (3) as:
B(τ) = α [E(t1 + τ) − E(t1)]− [C0 + c τ ]− β ER(t1 + τ)
= α [E(t1 + τ) − E(t1)]− [C0 + c τ ]− β [Etotal − E(t1 + τ)] (7)
The optimised protection is achieved when countermeasures are introduced at time
t1 and suspended after having been in action for a time period τ . The maximum
net beneﬁt can be found from:
dB(τ)
dτ
= α E˙(t1 + τ) − c + β E˙(t1 + τ) = 0 (8)
The intervention level, IL, for countermeasure suspension when both radiation
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protection factors and psychological factors related to the residual dose are taken
into consideration is thus given as:
ILrad+psy = E˙(t1 + τ) =
c
α + β
(9)
It appears that an overall optimization where both radiological and non-
radiological protection factors are included - corresponding to Fig. 7 - results in an
optimized level of overall protection which is diﬀerent from the sub-optimized lev-
els from an optimization of either radiological or psychological protection alone.
Such sub-optimizations would result in the following intervention levels:
ILrad =
c
α
and ILpsy =
c
β
(10)
With the above simpliﬁed assumptions it appears that the optimized intervention
level for overall health protection will be less than the optimized levels of protection
when only radiation protection factors or psychological factors are included alone.
3.4 Unresolved issues
Unresolved issues, both in the context of practical management and the practica-
bility of radiological guidance, have been identiﬁed to be the interaction between
radiological and non-radiological protection factors in decision-making. Both ra-
diological and non-radiological protection factors will inﬂuence the level of pro-
tective actions being introduced. Social-psychological countermeasures are a new
category of action, in the sense that social protection philosophy has not yet been
developed to fully include their application after a nuclear accident. From the ex-
perience in CIS following the Chernobyl accident, the need for social-psychological
countermeasures is obvious.
It has been suggested that the inclusion of such countermeasures into the inter-
vention decision making framework should be as a part of the radiation protection
framework. It is argued here that optimization of the overall health protection is
not a question of developing radiation protection philosophy to fully include socio-
psychological factors. It is rather a question of including these factors - in parallel
with the radiological protection factors - in cooperation between radiation protec-
tion experts and psychological specialists under the responsibility of the decision
maker.
The overall health protection of people after a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency should thus be based on an optimized countermeasure strategy, which
would include not only radiation protection factors but also other factors of polit-
ical, psychological and social nature. This overall optimization of the total health
protection is the responsibility of the decision maker(s) with guidance from radi-
ation protection experts as well as experts in the ﬁelds of social and psychological
sciences. The inclusion of these other factors in an overall optimization of health
protection after an accident is thus a discipline for decision makers and not an
extension of the radiation protection philosophy.
4 International and CIS Intervention
Criteria
The protective measures taken in the CIS after the Chernobyl accident included
early countermeasures like sheltering, administering stable iodine and evacuating
those parts of the population who might be exposed to radiation from the plume
and from deposited activity. Long-term countermeasures, such as relocation and
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foodstuﬀ restrictions, were taken to mitigate the eﬀects of lower, but still signiﬁ-
cant levels of radiation from surface and soil contamination. The levels at which
these measures were introduced were based on diﬀerent rationales, and the levels
have been changed by the competent authorities during the years following the
accident.
The basic intervention philosophy in the three republics have been under con-
stant evolution. At present, the diﬀerent concepts being developed include - in
addition to radiation protection factors - social protection considerations. It is
also considered to unify the systems of radiation protection for interventions and
practices.
4.1 Intervention criteria in the former USSR
The ﬁrst decision-making criteria in the USSR were developed in the 60-es and
adopted by the USSR Public Health Ministry (PHM) in December 1970. The
last pre-Chernobyl revision was approved oﬃcially by the PHM in August 1983.
“Criteria for urgent decision on measures to protect the population in the event
of a reactor accident” were designed for pre-planning of countermeasures at the
early phase after an accident. The criteria addressed the ﬁrst hours and days,
but no more than two weeks after the release of radioactive materials into the
environment, with the aim to prevent both deterministic health eﬀects (at that
time in terms of “non-stochastic eﬀects”) and a high probability of late stochastic
eﬀects, as well as to reduce economical losses caused by radioactive contamination.
The Criteria included a two-tier system for intervention levels in terms of external
dose (0.25 - 0.75 Gy), thyroid dose (0.3 - 2.5 Gy) and derived intervention levels
(DILs) for intake of 131I via inhalation and ingestion of foodstuﬀs, including a
peak value of activity concentration in milk.
The background for the development of the Criteria, the derivation and in-
terpretation of numerical values of intervention levels, as well as the compari-
son with international recommendations (including those updated after the Cher-
nobyl accident) are described in detail in the Final Report on JSP 2/TASK 1
[35]. Conceptually the Criteria were in line with the radiation protection princi-
ples for intervention adopted by international organizations (ICRP, IAEA). The
main methodological diﬀerence was that the Criteria assumed conservative (pes-
simistic) assessment of projected doses so actual doses would not be in excess of
those predicted. Consequently, there was an essential safety margin when compar-
ing the Criteria dose levels with those based on a realistic assessment of projected
or avertable dose.
The Criteria were used in decision making on evacuation of the 30-km-zone and
on other urgent countermeasures in the ﬁrst days after the Chernobyl accident,
including the introduction of temporary permissible levels (TPLs) of 131I content
in milk and other foodstuﬀs.
The chronology of major events in the decision making on countermeasures and
social policy after the Chernobyl accident is listed in Table 6.
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Table 6. Main events in decision making related to the Chernobyl accident (USSR,
Russia).
Date Main event
4 August 1983 Decision making criteria (DMC), 2nd revision
27 April - 6 May 1986 Urgent protective actions in line with the DMC
5 May 1986 DILs for 131I in foodstuﬀs
12 May 1986 Annual dose limit for ﬁrst year (100 mSv)
30 May 1986 DILs for β-activity in foodstuﬀs (TPL-86)
23 April 1987 Annual dose limit for second year (30 mSv)
15 December 1987 DILs for 134+137Cs in foodstuﬀs (TPL-88)
18 July 1988 Annual dose limit for 1988-1989 (25 mSv/year)
22 November 1988 Lifetime dose limit (LTD) of 350 mSv
25 April 1990 USSR Supreme Soviet rejects LTD-concept
22 January 1991 DILs for 134+137Cs and 90Sr in foodstuﬀs (TPL-91)
8 April 1991 Approval of annual dose concept
15 May 1991 RSFSR Supreme Soviet Act on social protection of
people aﬀected by the Chernobyl accident
21 July 1993 Revised DILs for 134+137Cs and 90Sr in foodstuﬀs
(TPL-93)
10 August 1993 Concept of radiation protection of people and
economic activities in the territories aﬀected by the
Chernobyl accident
22 September 1993 Criteria for registration of persons suﬀered from
exposure to radiation and exposed to radiation
17 July 1995 Concept of radiological, medical, social protection
and rehabilitation of people aﬀected by exposure
from radiation accidents
The table contains the main oﬃcial documents on regulations for basic intervention
levels in terms of annual or lifetime doses, temporary permissible levels (TPL) of
radionuclides in foodstuﬀs and oﬃcially approved concepts for management of
territories aﬀected by the Chernobyl accident.
The period from 1986 to the early 1990es was reviewed in a previous JSP 2
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Report [16]. In the ﬁrst half of this period decision policy was based on radiological
principles, although more conservative than those originating from optimization.
In the ﬁrst few years after the accident, γ-exposure rate in air, surface contami-
nation density and activity concentration in foodstuﬀs were used as main criteria
for the introduction of protective actions.
In 1988 the total dose from all exposure pathways due to the accident were
proposed as a criterion for decision making on protective actions. In accordance
to the recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protection of
USSR (NCRP), the ﬁrst of these dose criteria was the so-called “lifetime dose
concept”. This dose was a conservatively estimated total dose from all exposure
pathways due to the accident over a time period of 70 years under normal living
conditions in the contaminated territories. A lifetime dose level of 350 mSv was
suggested.
Due to the negative reaction of the public and local authorities the lifetime
dose concept - referred to as the “35-rem concept” - was oﬃcially rejected by the
USSR Supreme Soviet (Parliament) in April 1990. In the years 1990-1991 some
diﬀerences in intervention criteria between the aﬀected Soviet Republics, now CIS
states, started to appear.
4.2 Evolution of intervention criteria in Russia
The period since the late 80es was characterized by strong inﬂuence of non-
professional political and social forces on decision making on countermeasures and
social protection of populations living in contaminated territories. Under strong
pressure of socio-psychological and political factors, requirements for radiation
protection were more and more strict, which resulted in discrepancies between
the implemented decisions and the internationally accepted radiation protection
principles [15].
After the oﬃcial rejection of the lifetime dose concept another concept was
worked out as a compromise between the radiological principles and the inﬂuence
of non-professional forces [6]. Intervention levels in terms of eﬀective annual in-
dividual doses, Ean, formulated in a concept (Concept-91) approved oﬃcially in
April 1991 by the All-Union and Russian Federation governmental bodies, are still
in action. The values of 1 mSv/y and 5 mSv/y were conceptually formulated as a
non-action level and a control level, respectively.
If Ean exceeds 1 mSv, a complex of protective measures should be carried out.
These measures should simultaneously be aimed at relaxing the socio-psychological
tension and stress. The achievement of these goals should be based on optimization
with the condition that the average individual eﬀective dose should not exceed
5 mSv in 1991. This control level should, as far as possible, be reduced in the
following years to 1 mSv/y. The control level of 5 mSv/y was not established
as a criterion for compulsory relocation although in territories where the annual
eﬀective doses would exceed 1 mSv the population had the right to be relocated.
One of the main objectives of the concept was that the implementation of the State
Union-Republic program should avoid mass relocations. Based on this concept the
Chernobyl All-Union and republican laws were worked out and adopted in 1991.
It should be noted that some important issues of the Chernobyl All-Union and
Republican laws appeared to be serious self-contradictory and also in contradiction
with the concept. Both the annual eﬀective dose and the surface contamination
density were used for decision making on protective measures including compulsory
relocation. Radiological and social protective measures should be implemented in
territories with a surface contamination density of 137Cs larger than 37 kBq·km−2.
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Due to the contradictions the following would be the result:
• areas oﬃcially recognized as suﬀering from the accident increased many times:
from three to seventeen regions with an increase in population from about
100,000 to 2.7 millions people,
• additional compulsory mass relocations were decided,
• optimum levels of protection from a complex of countermeasures were impos-
sible to achieve, and
• additional social problems and negative consequences were created in the
aﬀected population.
Derived intervention levels (DILs) for foodstuﬀs (in terms of temporary permissible
levels, TPLs) are revised every two years. The evolution of DILs in USSR and
Russia are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Temporary Permissible Levels (TPL) for radiocesium in foodstuﬀs.
TPL (Bq/kg)a
Foodstuﬀs USSR Russia
1986b 1988 1991 1991 1993
Milk 3,700c 370 370 370 370
Meat, ﬁsh, eggs 3,700 1,800-2,960 740 740 600
Fat 7,400 370 185 37 370
Potatoes, vegetables,
fruits 3,700 740 600 74 600
Cereal products 370 370 370 370 370
Wild berries,
mushrooms 18,500 1,740 148 148 600
Infant food - 370 185 37 185
Drinking water 370 18.5 18.5 3.7 -
a sum of 134Cs and 137Cs activity
b total β-activity
c 370 Bq/kg from 1 November, 1986
The last revision was made in 1993. The original draft of TPL-93 suggested a
structure and also numerical values close to those for imported foodstuﬀs in CEC
and Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO/WHO). Two categories of food were
suggested instead of a long list of food items in the preceding TPLs from 1986
to 1991. But the State Committee on Sanitary Supervision (SCSS) inserted into
the “Milk and infant food” category a variety of other food items and insisted
on the introduction of a separate category for infant food and on lowering the
numerical values for this kind of food by a factor of two for 134Cs/137Cs and a
tenfold reduction for 90Sr. TPL-93 were oﬃcially approved by the SCSS in July
1993. The listing of food items and numerical values of TPL-93 are presented in
Table 8.
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Table 8. Temporary Permissible Levels (TPL) for content of 134Cs, 137Cs and 90Sr
in foodstuﬀs (TPL-93).
TPL (Bq/kg)
Foodstuﬀs (nCi/kg)
134Cs, 137Cs 90Sr
Milk, sour milk products, cream,
cottage cheese, cream butter, bread, 370 37
bread products, cereals, sugar, fat (10) (1)
(vegetable and animal), margarine
All kinds of speciﬁc infant food 185 3.7
(ready for consumption) (5) (0.1)
Other food products 600 100
(16) (3)
There are some comments in the oﬃcial document, the most essential are as fol-
lows:
• TPL-93 are derived in such a way, that even in unrealistic conditions of perma-
nent annual consumption of each food product with contamination at the TPL
level, the committed eﬀective dose would not exceed 5 mSv from 137+134Cs
and 1-2 mSv from 90Sr.
• TPL for tea, honey, medicine plants and other products with per capita con-
sumption less than 10 kg/y are 10 times higher than for “other food prod-
ucts”; TPL for concentrated, condensed and dried milk is two times higher
than shown in the table for “other products”.
TPL-93 is formally designed for a two year period. At present, a new revision is
in progress.
4.2.1 Countermeasures
The main long-term protective measures taken after the Chernobyl accident
included relocation of people from the most contaminated areas as well as con-
tinuing restrictions of foodstuﬀs contaminated with radiocesium.
Relocation
Evacuation was not justiﬁed in any Russian territory according to the decision
making criteria for urgent protective measures (DMC-83), as it was for the 30-km
zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In August 1986 four villages with
a total population of 185 persons were resettled. The decision was justiﬁed by the
conservative assumption that countermeasures (other than resettlement) provided
no guarantee to prevent doses above 100 mSv/y in villages with the highest level
of contamination.
The next step in organized relocation was a decree in September 1989 on a ﬁrst
order relocation of settlements with a surface contamination density (S) of 137Cs
greater than 40 Ci/km2. A total of 44 settlements with a population of 6,800
were relocated. The Federal Law-1991 conﬁrmed obligatory relocation from areas
with a surface contamination density S > 40 Ci/km2 and the right to relocation
in territories with S > 15 Ci/km2. In a previous JSP 2 Report [19], population
distributions on surface contamination density of 137Cs, on annual eﬀective dose
in 1991 as well as on avertable lifetime dose were presented. 84,000 people lived
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in 1991 in the zone of relocation with S > 15 Ci/km2, half of them in the city
of Novozybkov where the annual individual doses were less than 1 mSv. The
annual individual eﬀective doses in 1991 exceeded 1 mSv in settlements with a
total population of 105,000. About 37% of this population lived in the zone of
relocation, 44% in the zone of right for relocation and the rest in territories with
a contamination density S < 5 Ci/km2.
In 1991 a total of 7989 persons were oﬃcially relocated from contaminated
territories of the Bryansk Region, including zones of relocation and zones of right
to be relocated (data from the Bryansk Regional Department of Statistics). In the
following two years the number of relocated people were 4,632 and 2,601. The total
number of relocated people during a period from 1989 to 1993 was 36,084 with a
maximum value in 1990 of 17,162. The obvious sharp decrease in relocation from
1990 to 1993 is the result of not only the economical and organizational diﬃculties,
but also from the fact that the attitude of the population to relocation and to the
possibilities of healthy living conditions in the contaminated areas became more
realistic.
Practically all people in the aﬀected regions who wanted to be relocated due
to concern and fear have now been relocated (totally 47,000 people in the period
1986-1995). Moreover, in the later years (1993-1995) the number of people mov-
ing into the contaminated areas of Bryansk region, including those returning to
their previous sites, prevailed against the number of people leaving the zones of
relocation and of right for relocation. This migration process is caused by a gen-
eral decrease in living conditions and essential beneﬁts and compensations for
those residing contaminated territory. Apparently, an actual curtailment of the
relocation program should be considered positively. Cost-beneﬁt analyses showed
that the monetary equivalent of doses averted by relocation of people from the
zone of obligatory relocation is 40 times less than the actual expenses for reloca-
tion in 1989-1993 [41].
Food control
Current values of activity concentration of radiocesium in milk and other locally
produced foodstuﬀs, excluding “wild” food products, are almost everywhere lower
than TPL-93 levels. In the most contaminated areas of Russia - the western dis-
tricts of the Bryansk Region - only 0.7% of the milk samples taken in 1994 were
contaminated in excess of TPL, while in 1986 this index was 75%. The average
value of the annual internal dose from 134Cs and 137Cs calculated from whole body
measurement data and averaged for rural population of the “strict control zone”
(now deﬁned as the relocation zone) decreased from 6 mSv in 1986 to 0.5 mSv
in 1992 [34]. Thereafter, a marked increase in radiocesium body content was ob-
served, resulting in a increase of the internal doses in 1993-1995 up to a factor of
two and more in some settlements compared with the internal doses in 1991-1992.
This increase can be explained by the following reasons:
(1) The supply with foodstuﬀs from uncontaminated regions (mainly milk and
meat products) to local people from uncontaminated regions is sharply re-
duced in view of, ﬁrstly, economical circumstances, and secondly, the fact
that there are no reasons to restrict the use of local foodstuﬀ production
when its contamination is lower than TPL values.
(2) The change in Russian economy resulted in a strong rise in foodstuﬀ prices,
which forced rural people to resume their private farming activities, previously
disturbed by countermeasures. The number of “private” cows raised more
than ﬁve times after the lowest level in 1991.
(3) There is also a growth in consumption of “wild” food items: mushrooms,
berries, ﬁsh from local water basins, and game. This kind of natural produce
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is characterized by relatively high levels of contamination with radiocesium.
Currently (1993-1995) the activity concentration in various kinds of edible
mushrooms shows a large variation, from 0.2 to 220 kBq/kg, and in berries
from 0.007 to 7 Bq/kg. Analyses of questionnaires on food habits in the local
population have given the following distribution of intake of radiocesium via
foods. Consumption of milk varies from a few per cent to 43%, in average
22%. The contribution of mushrooms and wild berries to internal doses was
in average 41%, varying from a few per cent to 63% [36].
Relatively high levels of radiocesium content in mushrooms and berries is a point
of discussion with sanitary supervision inspectors. It is noted in the comments to
TPL-93 that for food items with per capita consumption less than 10 kg/y, TPL
should be 10 times higher than values set for “other food products” (see Table 8
and the text following the table). Questionnaires cited above have given average
values for people from 13 surveyed rural settlements of 5.7 kg/y for mushrooms
and 1.0 kg/y for wild berries. The maximum values for one of the villages was 19.2
kg/y for mushrooms and 2.5 kg/y for berries. The “mushroom problem” would be
a matter of consideration in the drafting of a new TPL-96 to replace TPL-93 (in
view of the procedure to review TPLs once every two years).
4.2.2 Development of intervention concepts for later phases
Starting from the late 1980es the actually authorized decisions were made un-
der a strong pressure of social, psychological and political factors, resulting in
unreasonable increases in radiation protection demands. The zones aﬀected by
radiation protection and social assistance measures have therefore expanded giv-
ing the public the false impression that the radiation hazard was underestimated
in the ﬁrst months and years following the accident. In the Russian Federation
the number of residents in territories aﬀected by the implementation of radiation
and social protection measures raised from 88,000 in 1986 (territories with 137Cs
contamination S > 555 kBq/m2 where annual doses in excess of 100 mSv were
conservatively projected if no countermeasures were undertaken) to 1.5 millions
in 1991 and 2.7 millions in 1993 (territories with S > 37 kBq/m2 in line with the
legislative deﬁnition of contaminated zones in 1991).
A paradoxical phenomenon did arise. Instead of changing to a recovery phase fol-
lowing the accident, the scale of intervention did increase. This phenomenon was a
result of both current socio-political processes in the USSR/CIS/Russia and lack
of methodology for decision making at the late stages of the accident situation
when return to normal living conditions in areas aﬀected by radioactive contam-
ination were needed. This need has in the latest years lead to development of a
conceptual basis for rehabilitation of territories aﬀected by radioactive contami-
nation. The aim of this new development is to optimize social protection measures
and the number of people involved in social attention related to the Chernobyl
accident, in line with actual radiological criteria and available resources.
The social impact of the Chernobyl accident and the decisions on social assis-
tance to the aﬀected population resulted in an increase in public anxiety because
of situations created in the past by the Kysthym accident, radioactive discharges
into river Techa in Urals and by nuclear weapons tests. New concepts relating to
all situations with a wide-scale radioactive contamination were therefore needed.
This stage of conceptual evolution started in the early 1990es. The essential con-
tent of the “Concept-93” has been described in a previous JSP 2 Report [18]. “The
concept of radiation protection of the population and economic activities in the
territories aﬀected by radioactive contamination” was oﬃcially approved by the
Russian Federation Council of Ministers Decree from 10 August, 1993 as a base
for development of legislation and standardization in social protection of people
Risø-R-831(EN) 31
“suﬀering from radioactive contamination and for rehabilitation of the territories
aﬀected by radioactive contamination”. The Prime Minister ordered to direct the
Concept towards involved Ministries and regional administrative authorities.
The following conceptual step in the evolution of regulation to manage territo-
ries and people aﬀected by abnormal exposure to radiation was the development
of a “Concept of radiation, medical, social protection and rehabilitation of popu-
lation aﬀected by accidental exposure to radiation”. The Concept was approved
by the Russian Scientiﬁc Commission on Radiation Protection. In July 1995 the
Government of the Russian Federation recommended “to use this concept for
elaboration of regulating acts and target programs in the ﬁeld of social protec-
tion of people aﬀected by accidental radiation”. The terms “accidental radiation”
and “exposure to accidental radiation” meant here exposure to radiation from en-
vironmental radioactive contamination following past radiological accidents and
nuclear weapons tests.
The Concept-93 was aimed mainly to regulate activities and restrictions in con-
taminated territories. The Concept-95 formulated scientiﬁc principles and meth-
ods for the practical realization of protection of involved people, with the aim to
prevent or mitigate health consequences of the past radiological incidents, to elim-
inate or minimize psychological stress, and to compensate individual material and
moral losses. The list of radiological protective measures was related to the lat-
est stage of post-accident management in contaminated territories. The latter is
deﬁned as the areas where a current annual eﬀective dose to local population is
equal to or above 1 mSv.
Contaminated territories are subdivided into two zones in accordance with the
value of annual eﬀective dose in the absence of countermeasures such as engineering
decontamination of settlements and supply by radiologically “clean” foods:
• zone of radiation control (1-5 mSv/y), and
• zone of restricted residence (5-20 mSv/y).
Radiological monitoring of the environment, agricultural products and doses to
the population is carried out in both zones, as well as countermeasures to reduce
doses to the population in line with the principle of optimization of intervention. In
the zone of restricted residence, radiation risk and undesirability for families with
children to move into the zone would be explained to local residents and to persons
moving to live in this zone. The residents are assisted to resettle outside the zone
upon their own decision. The upper dose bound for this zone is truncated at a
level of 20 mSv. The reason is that today there are no settlements in the Russian
Federation with an average annual eﬀective dose in excess of 20 mSv resulting
from the Ural and Chernobyl accidents or from past nuclear weapons tests.
Concept-95 introduced deﬁnition of two categories of people aﬀected by expo-
sure to radiation:
• exposed person is an individual with acute (short-term) dose more than 50
mSv or with accumulated eﬀective dose from chronic (prolonged) exposure in
excess of 70 mSv.
• suﬀered person (victim) is an individual with deterministic health eﬀects or
with other diseases oﬃcially ascertained as consequences of radiation or of
other circumstances of an accidental situation.
Both exposed and suﬀered persons should be included into the National radiation
and epidemiological registry.
The Registry was previously oﬃcialized by the Decree of the Russian Federation
Council of Ministers from 22 September, 1993 “On national registration of persons
exposed to radiation and radiation eﬀects as a result of the Chernobyl accident
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and other radiation-related disasters and incidents”. The criteria for registration
introduced in the appendix to this Decree were not the same as established later
in the Concept-95.
For all people exposed to and suﬀered from radiation a system of health care
and rehabilitation is suggested with special attention to suﬀered persons (victims)
and to members of the “enhanced risk groups”. Concept-95 deﬁnes these groups
as persons with latent or evident pathologic manifestations and with high doses. A
high dose is deﬁned as an eﬀective dose in excess of 250 mSv from acute exposure
or 350 mSv from chronic exposure, as well as a thyroid dose more than 2.5 Gy for
adults and 1.0 Gy for children, and in utero exposure to doses above 50 mSv.
Health protection suggests measures to raise a general and anti-cancerogenic re-
sistance of human organism as well as measures to restrict the inﬂuence of other
harmful factors than those of radiation. Psychological protection means improve-
ment of public knowledge on radiation eﬀects, possibilities to gain trustworthy and
intelligible information on radiological situation, and foundation of psychological
assisting centres in contaminated regions. A system of beneﬁts and compensations
should be established for exposed persons and for people living in settlements with
an eﬀective dose above 1 mSv/y. The Concept-95 includes also general recommen-
dations for legal guarantee of the listed protective measures.
In case of transfer to new concepts (Concept-95) the number of people aﬀected
by social attention and beneﬁts related to the consequences of the Chernobyl
accident, would be sharply reduced. A total of 2.7 millions are living in 7544
settlements assigned to contaminated zones in line with the Law that is currently
in action (territories of the Russian Federation with 137Cs contamination more
than 37 kBq/m2). Current regulations provide a diﬀerential system of collective
and personal beneﬁts and compensations for all these territories and populations.
It has been shown in a preceding JSP 2 Report that 105,000 people are living
in settlements with an average annual eﬀective dose in excess of 1 mSv in 1991
(Table 2 in [19]).
Taking into consideration the minor changes in doses during the latest years as
well as actual demographic processes in the involved region, the number of people
in settlements with current doses exceeding 1 mSv/y is now almost the same as
in 1991, i.e., about one hundred thousands. Therefore, 96% of the population cur-
rently assigned as living in contaminated zones will deprive of existing privileges.
One may anticipate that the local authorities should categorically raise objec-
tions against a curtailment of the federal program in their regions. A negative
response of the general public in the aﬀected territories may also quite obviously
be predicted. Anyway, in the best case, the introduction of the latest concept into
practical realization will essentially need a transient period. In the worst case, a
situation may arise similar to that in 1989-1990, when the lifetime dose concept
(often referred as “35 rem concept”) failed to be realized.
4.2.3 Revision of general decision making criteria
The Chernobyl experience and the latest international recommendations (ICRP
Publications 60 and 63, IAEA Safety Series No. 109, Basic Safety Standards) were
taken into consideration in drafting the new Russian Radiation Safety Standards
(RSS-96), which was adopted 19 April 1996 to replace current RSS-76/87 [40].
The latter were worked out in 1970es with slight amendment in 1987, and they
are no longer in line with the updated philosophy and standards in international
radiation protection guidance.
The RSS-96 is conceptually in accordance with the ICRP Publication 60 and the
Basic Safety Standards. The methodology of dose limitation in the RSS is diﬀeren-
tiated to four kinds of situations with exposure to ionizing radiation: occupational
and public exposure in normal operation with sources of ionizing radiation, expo-
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sure to natural background sources, medical exposure, and emergency exposure
situations. In view of high social importance of dealing with emergency situations,
it was agreed to include into RSS a separate section on radiological protection of
the general public in case of a radiation accident. This section of the RSS draft is
summarized below.
Justiﬁcation and optimization principles for intervention similar to those in
ICRP-60 have been formulated. Notwithstanding these principles, urgent protec-
tive actions should be mandatory in case if projected acute exposure may reach
the level associated with possible clinically pronounced health eﬀects (determin-
istic eﬀects). The corresponding doses in 2 days are quoted from the Basic Safety
Standards: 1 Gy to the whole body and 2 to 6 Gy to other single organs or tis-
sues. Site-speciﬁc intervention levels should be justiﬁed in pre-planning emergency
response for speciﬁed installations and accident scenarios.
In case of an accident resulting in oﬀ-site radioactive contamination of large
territories, a zone of radiation accident (ZRA) should be established. ZRAs are
deﬁned as a territory where a projected exposure to radiation may exceed an ef-
fective dose of 5 mSv per year. Radiological monitoring should be carried out in
ZRA, as well as protective measures to reduce radiation doses applying principle
of optimization in intervention. A two-tier system of generic intervention levels
has been formulated for both urgent countermeasures at the early stage of acci-
dent situation and long-term countermeasures at later stages of the accident. The
numerical values of decision making criteria are presented in Tables 9-11: an up-
per level B above which the introduction of countermeasures is compulsory and
a lower level A having the role of a non-action level. Detailed special guidance
on management of radiological accidents is suggested to be worked out as safety
guides for practical application of the RSS.
Table 9. Decision making criteria for urgent countermeasures at the early stage of
an accident situation (RSS-96).
Projected dose for 10 days (mGy)
Countermeasures Whole body Thyroid, lungs, skin
Level A Level B Level A Level B
Sheltering 5 50 50 500
Iodine prophylaxis
Children - - 100 1,000
Adults - - 250 2,500
Evacuation 50 500 500 2,500
Table 10. Decision making criteria for relocation and food control (RSS-96).
Avertable eﬀective dose (mSv)
Countermeasures
Level A Level B
Restrictions in consumption of 5 (ﬁrst year) 50 (ﬁrst year)
contaminated foodstuﬀs and
drinking water 1/y (following years) 10/y (following years)
Relocation 50 (ﬁrst year) 500 (ﬁrst year)
1000 for relocation period
New basic recommendations applicable to the existing contaminated territories
and possible future accidental situations are being developed to include all experi-
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Table 11. Decision making criteria for food control in the ﬁrst year after an acci-
dent (RSS-96).
Activity concentration in foodstuﬀs
Radionuclides (kBq/kg)
Level A Level B
131I, 134Cs, 137Cs 1 3
90Sr 0.1 0.3
ence on liquidation of the consequences of nuclear accidents and nuclear weapons
tests. The guidance will be based on both radiation and non-radiation risks and
will be expressed in three sets of diﬀerent intervention levels:
(a) General Intervention Levels (projected doses) establishing strategies of inter-
vention;
(b) Speciﬁed Intervention Levels (avertable doses or risks) for radiation protection
purposes;
(c) Speciﬁed Intervention Levels (residual doses or risks) for social protection
purposes.
The last set of levels was primary introduced for social protection of the population
in the Altai region aﬀected by the nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk test
site. Obviously, this set of levels should have a wider application and should be
improved taking into account new data and new experience.
In addition to the general recommendations on intervention strategy and inter-
vention levels, the speciﬁc recommendations on methodology of risk analysis for
post-accidental situations and optimization of strategies of protective and rehabil-
itation measures are being developed for approval. These developments are using
the results from the EU/CIS cooperative research projects (ECPs and JSPs). The
new recommendations are expected to be ﬁnalized in 1996.
4.3 Intervention criteria in Belarus
In the ﬁrst years after the Chernobyl accident the Byelorussian regulation followed
that of the All-Union (USSR). Starting from 1990-91 the basic documents that
regulate the use of countermeasures in the Republic of Belarus are the following:
(1) Republican concept of living in the territories contaminated with radionu-
clides as a result of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant catastrophe, adopted
by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences of
19 December, 1990;
(2) Concept of residing the population in the regions aﬀected by the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant catastrophe, adopted by the USSR Government of 8
April, 1991, N164.
The essence of the second concept is that two levels of annual individual eﬀective
doses of “Chernobyl origin” were established for introduction of countermeasures:
• when annual individual eﬀective doses do not exceed 1 mSv no interventions
should be made;
• when annual individual eﬀective doses fall in the range of 1-5 mSv a complex
of protective measures should be used aimed at constantly reducing the dose
rate;
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• when annual individual eﬀective doses exceed 5 mSv resettlement should be
implemented.
At present, Byelorussian scientists develop a concept of protective measures in
a rehabilitation period for the population living in territories of the Republic
of Belarus aﬀected by the Chernobyl accident. This concept is at the stage of
adoption.
According to the concept, in territories where the annual individual eﬀective
doses do not exceed 1 mSv, living conditions and economic activities should not be
limited by radiation protection factors. Consequently, additional exposure of the
population due to radioactive fall-out resulting in annual individual eﬀective doses
lower than 1 mSv is permissible and should not require any limitations (Article
3 of the law On Social Protection of Citizens Aﬀected by the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant Catastrophe). Monitoring of objects in the natural environment and
of agricultural production should be carried out to calculate and estimate real
radiation doses to the population and to implement, if needed, limited and local
protection measures.
In territories where annual individual eﬀective doses exceed 1 mSv but are lower
than 5 mSv, well-grounded activities aimed at further reduction of individual and
collective doses should be implemented. These measure would include, in addition
to radiation monitoring of the natural environment and of agricultural produc-
tion, local decontamination of sites where the external exposure is the dominating
exposure pathway.
In territories where the annual individual eﬀective doses exceed 5 mSv, residing
would not be recommended and economic activities would be limited.
According to the Republican concept the level of 5 mSv/y from the Chernobyl
accident should constantly be reduced. The reduction rate were deﬁned as:
1990 5 mSv/y
1993 3 mSv/y
1995 2 mSv/y
1998 1 mSv/y
The above mentioned concepts have been used as basis of the law of the Republic
of Belarus On Social Protection of the Citizens Aﬀected by the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant Catastrophe.
4.4 Evolution of intervention criteria in Ukraine
The Ukrainian strategy for setting criteria in terms of intervention levels for
countermeasures on the radioactive contaminated territories in Ukraine has been
changing during all the years following the Chernobyl accident. In the years 1986-
1989, the USSR criteria formed the basis for protective measures in Ukraine.
In 1989-1991 the “two-tier-lifetime-dose concept” for decision making was con-
sidered in Ukraine. Two lifetime dose levels over 70 years of 70 mSv and 150
mSv were suggested as intervention levels. This concept has not been applied in
Ukraine.
In 1991 the so-called “three-tier-annual-dose concept for intervention was pro-
posed in Ukraine. In accordance to this concept the annual dose for decision mak-
ing in certain settlements was to be the sum of the external γ-dose from deposited
activity, the internal dose from ingestion of locally grown contaminated foodstuﬀs
containing 137Cs and 90Sr, and the inhalation dose from resuspension of pluto-
nium.
This “three-tier-annual-dose concept” for intervention has been used in Ukraine
up until 1995. The intervention levels were 1 mSv/y and 5 mSv/y and since
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1994 also 0.5 mSv/y. In accordance to these levels all contaminated territories
in Ukraine were divided in zones. Diﬀerent sets of countermeasures, monetary
compensations and privileges were introduced in each zone. The radiological con-
trol were provided in the territories where the annual doses were 0.5-1 mSv. The
complex of protective actions were to be taken in territories where the annual
doses were in the range 1-5 mSv. In territories where the annual doses exceeded 5
mSv relocation (resettlement) were to be considered.
The evolution of the Ukrainian criteria is shown in Fig. 9.
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Figure 9. Evolution of Ukrainian criteria for countermeasures during the years
1991-1995.
At present, in the large part of the aﬀected territory of Ukraine the annual doses
do not exceed 1 mSv. This level of dose is identical to the dose limit for exposure
of the population in practices used in many countries including Ukraine. However,
because the exposure from the Chernobyl accident and the exposure from non-
accidental sources were considered separately, the social security of inhabitants
receiving the same doses depends on the origin of the source giving rise to the
exposure.
Taking into account this curiosity the possibility of a new concept of intervention
level in territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident are now considered.
The main peculiarities of this new concept are the following:
• changing the dose levels for territory zones;
• changing both the concept of annual dose and the methodology of annual
dose calculation for dividing into zones.
It is proposed to determine the annual dose for intervention as the sum of ac-
cidental doses (from all Chernobyl exposure pathways) and industrial exposure
(practices).
Annual dose levels of 1, 5 and 20 mSv are considered as intervention levels for
the whole Ukrainian territory. The protective actions related to these levels are:
• no special protective actions have to be implemented if the annual dose in
settlements is below 1 mSv;
• radiological control has to be provided in territories where the annual doses
are in the range of 1-5 mSv; eﬀective protective actions should be introduced
for the settlements where the annual doses are in the range of 5-20 mSv;
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• the possibility of resettlement must be considered if the annual doses exceed
20 mSv.
Such type of guidance for interventions is a compromise and, in some sense, a com-
position of practice and intervention criteria for the late phase of the Chernobyl
accident. Therefore, the realization of this guidance is possible only if the addi-
tional accidental exposure is comparable to the exposure from normal practices
for most of the territories.
If the society is ready to set up these dose levels for the population living
around nuclear power plants, the value of these dose levels for the Chernobyl
contaminated territories have to be decreased with the fraction due to Chernobyl
in the late phase.
This concept has been revised and already accepted not only by single scientists
but also by the National Commission of Radiation Protection of Ukraine, the
health Ministry, the Ministry of Chernobyl and the Council of Ministry. At present,
it is under consideration by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.
4.5 Evolution of international guidance
Over the past decade considerable progress has been made in developing interna-
tionally recognized principles for decisions on protective measures following acci-
dents involving radioactive material, and in providing quantitative guidance for
applying these principles, notably by the International Commission on Radiolog-
ical Protection (ICRP), the IAEA, the World Health Organization (WHO), the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Commis-
sion of the European Communities (CEC) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA).
Following the accident at Chernobyl, it became evident that some clariﬁcation of
the basic principles for intervention was necessary. In particular, it became clear
from the experience of the Chernobyl accident recovery that there was a need
for a simple set of internally consistent intervention levels that could have some
generic application internationally. Such a set of values was considered desirable to
increase public conﬁdence in authorities charged with dealing with the aftermath
of an accident.
4.5.1 International Guidance at the time of the Chernobyl Accident
The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) was the ﬁrst international
body to publish guidance in 1982 to its member states on reference levels of radia-
tion dose as guidance to national authorities in setting intervention levels. Similar
guidance was published by the ICRP in 1984 [25], World Health Organization,
WHO, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA.
The guidance given by these four organizations was similar in essence. The WHO
guidance was less quantitative; the reference dose levels for sheltering, distribution
of stable iodine tablets, and evacuation set forth by CEC diﬀer slightly from those
given by ICRP and IAEA; and the CEC did not give any values for control of
foodstuﬀs. The ICRP and IAEA gave almost identical advice.
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The basic principles given by ICRP [25] for planning intervention for accident
situations and setting intervention levels were the following:
(a) Serious deterministic eﬀects should be avoided by the introduction of coun-
termeasures to limit individual dose to levels below the thresholds for these
eﬀects;
(b) The risk from stochastic eﬀects should be limited by introducing countermea-
sures which achieve a positive net beneﬁt to the individuals involved;
(c) The overall incidence of stochastic eﬀects should be limited, as far as reason-
ably practicable, by reducing the collective dose equivalent.
It was internationally recognized that the spectrum of accident situations is wide,
and that diﬃculties in implementing protective measures after an accident vary
widely from country to country and even from place to place within a country.
Therefore, it was not considered possible to set one generally applicable interven-
tion level at which a particular action would always be required.
On the other hand, it was recognized that introduction of protective measures
would be almost certain if the projected radiation dose were such that serious
deterministic eﬀects or a high probability of stochastic eﬀects would be expected.
It was also considered that it would be possible, on radiation protection grounds, to
deﬁne a level of radiation dose for each countermeasure below which introduction
of the countermeasure would not likely be warranted.
The numerical values of the intervention levels recommended by ICRP [25] for
the ﬁrst year after the accident are summarised in Table 12.
Upper dose levels above which introduction of the countermeasure is almost
certain and lower dose levels, below which introduction of the countermeasure
is not warranted were given for whole body irradiation and also for individual
organs. Between the recommended upper and lower levels site-speciﬁc interven-
tion levels were expected to be set by national authorities. The intervention levels
covered both early and intermediate phases. For the late phase no values were
recommended, since it was considered that the main questions facing the deci-
sion maker would be whether and when normal living could be resumed, and the
situations would vary too widely to give any generic numbers for that purpose.
Table 12. ICRP intervention level ranges for introducing countermeasures.
Dose levels for intervention
Protective measure Whole body Single organs
Sheltering 5 - 50 mSv 50 - 500 mSv
Stable iodine - 50 - 500 mSv
Evacuation 50 - 500 mSv 500 - 5000 mSv
Relocation 50 - 500 mSv/a not anticipated
Control of foodstuﬀs 5 - 50 mSv/a 50 - 500 mSv/a
The projected dose per year for relocation and foodstuﬀ control are deﬁned only
for the ﬁrst year.
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In regard to international guidance on intervention levels a number of problems
were identiﬁed when it was applied to the Chernobyl accident, although its basic
principles were still considered to be valid. The major diﬃculties in its application
were:
• how to apply the intervention levels; for example, in the case of food, did
the intervention level refer to the sum of the food items or to each foodstuﬀ
separately?
• how to compare the dose with the intervention level; was the projected dose
or the avertable dose relevant?
• how was the principle (c) to be applied? what was the relationship between
principles (b) and (c)?
Major confusion was also created by the references in the ICRP Publication 40
[25] to the dose limits in justifying the numerical values of the intervention levels.
The radiation protection philosophy of today distinguishes between the intro-
duction of a practice which causes either actual exposures or probabilities of ex-
posure and therefore will add radiation doses to the existing background, and
intervention in existing (de-facto) situations involving radiation exposures, with
the aim to decrease or subtract such exposures.
4.5.2 ICRP Publication 63
ICRP Publication 63 [29] updates and extends ICRP Publication 40 and includes
quantitative guidance on intervention levels. This guidance covers the introduction
of such protective actions over very short times, their introduction and continua-
tion following periodic review over protracted timescales lasting perhaps years and
intervention over larger areas. All accidents are diﬀerent, as are the approaches
of national organizations having responsibility for response to an accident. It is
the intention of ICRP that the general guidelines in Publication 63 should be
translated into appropriate emergency response plans by competent national au-
thorities.
Publication 63 establishes for each protective action an almost always justiﬁed
intervention level which is deﬁned as the level of avertable dose above which it
is likely that intervention is almost always justiﬁed. In addition, the publication
recommends that the optimized intervention level that would be achievable in
practice depending on the accidental and site speciﬁc circumstances is likely to
be no more than a factor of ten below the almost always justiﬁed value. The
recommended intervention levels in Publication 63 are given in Table 13 [29].
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Table 13. Recommended intervention levels from ICRP in Publication 63 for shel-
tering, evacuation, iodine prophylaxis, relocation and foodstuﬀ restrictions.
Intervention levels of avertable dose or avertable activity concentration
Protective measure Almost always justiﬁed Range of optimized
(mSv) values (mSv)
Sheltering 50(a) 5-50(a)
(less than 1 day)
Iodine prophylaxis 500(b) 50-500(b)
Evacuation 500(a) 50-500(a)
(less than 1 week) 5,000(c) 500-5,000(c)
Relocation 1,000(a) 5-15 mSv·month−1 (a)
Restriction on a 10 mSv in a year(d) 1-10 kBq·kg−1 (β)
single foodstuﬀ 10-100 Bq·kg−1 (α)
(a) Level of avertable eﬀective dose.
(b) Level of avertable equivalent dose to thyroid.
(c) Level of avertable equivalent dose to skin.
(d) Level of avertable eﬀective dose committed in a year.
4.5.3 IAEA Safety Series No. 109
Following the Chernobyl accident, it became evident that some clariﬁcation of the
basic principles for intervention was necessary, as well as more internationally rec-
ognized numerical guidance. Because of the need to have international consensus
on the values of these generic intervention levels, an Advisory Group developed
proposals that were published in a Technical Document (IAEA-TECDOC-698)
in April 1993, entitled Generic Intervention Levels for Protecting the Public in
the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. This interim report
was circulated to all Member States of the IAEA and to other organisations for
comments.
In September 1993, the IAEA convened a Technical Committee on Intervention
after Accidents, which modiﬁed the text and values proposed in the TECDOC-
698, taking account of the many comments received from Member States and
international organisations and combined them with the draft revision of Safety
Series No. 72. The result of this work is a Safety Guide, that represents the inter-
national consensus reached on principles for intervention and numerical values for
Generic Intervention Levels. The Safety Guide has been published as Safety Series
No. 109 [21]. The generic intervention levels for urgent and longer term protective
actions are given in Table 14.
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Table 14. Generic intervention levels for sheltering, evacuation, iodine prophylaxis,
temporary relocation and permanent resettlement from IAEA Safety Series No.
109.
Protective measure Generic optimized intervention level
(avertable dose(a) by the countermeasure)
Sheltering 10(b)
(less than 1 day)
Evacuation 50 mSv(c)
(less than 1 week)
Iodine prophylaxis 100 mGy due to radioiodine(d)
Temporary relocation Initiate at 30 mSv in a month;
suspend at 10 mSv in a month
Permanent relocation If lifetime dose would exceed 1 Sv or
if relocation time would exceed 1-2 years
(a) Sum of external and committed internal eﬀective dose, unless noted.
(b) This generic level has been optimized for the maximum anticipated period of sheltering (2
days). Authorities may advise sheltering at lower intervention levels for shorter periods, or
to facilitate further protective actions, eg, evacuation.
(c) This generic level has been optimized for the maximum anticipated period of evacuation (7
days). Authorities may initiate evacuation at lower intervention levels for shorter periods
and also where evacuation can be carried out quickly and easily, eg, for small groups of
people. Higher intervention levels may be appropriate in situations where evacuation would
be diﬃcult, eg, for large populations or in the case of inadequate transportation.
(d) Committed dose to the thyroid.
Control of food and water may have to be considered under three diﬀerent cir-
cumstances: where alternative supplies are available; where alternative supplies
are scarce; and for distribution in international trade.
Intervention levels speciﬁcally for the withdrawal and substitution of foodstuﬀs
can be developed according to the principles of justiﬁcation and optimization.
Where alternative food supplies are readily available, the requirement that in-
tervention be justiﬁed is easily satisﬁed. It is, however, important in the process
of optimization that consideration be given to other measures that could reduce
levels of food contamination still further. Some agricultural countermeasures do
exist that can be assumed generally feasible, such as transferring animals to stored
feed. These kinds of countermeasures are often highly cost-eﬀective. The numeri-
cal values of the levels emerging from optimization of agricultural countermeasures
(action levels) are almost always lower than the levels (intervention levels) devel-
oped on the basis of withdrawing and substituting foodstuﬀs alone.
The generic action levels for use by national authorities when alternative sup-
plies of food are available are given in Table 15.
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Table 15. Generic Action Levels for foodstuﬀs from IAEA Safety Series No. 109.
Action levels for foodstuﬀ countermeasures (kBq·kg−1)
Radionuclides Foods destined for Milk, infant foods
general consumption and drinking water
134,137Cs, 103,106Ru, 89Sr 1 1
131I 0.1
90Sr 0.1
241Am, 238,239Pu 0.01 0.001
In situations where extensive restrictions on food supplies could result in nutri-
tional deﬁciencies or, in the extreme, starvation, case-by-case evaluations will be
required. The intervention levels that would emerge from an optimization in the
situation where alternative supplies are scarce would be similar to the values rec-
ommended by the ICRP in Table 13. For example, for β-emitters like 134+137Cs
and 131I in milk and vegetables, the optimized intervention level for withdrawal
and substitution would be about one to about ten kBq/kg. For meat and milk
products, the corresponding intervention levels would be about ten to about a
hundred kBq/kg.
The guidance given by IAEA in the Safety Series No. 109 [21] and shown in
Tables 14 and 15 have all been used in the Basic Safety Standards from six inter-
national organisations [20].
4.6 CIS-guidance compared with international guidance
According to the international guidance from ICRP and IAEA intervention levels
refer to the dose that is expected to be averted (avertable dose) by a speciﬁc coun-
termeasure over the period it is in eﬀect. If an intervention level (IL) is exceeded,
i.e., if the expected avertable individual dose is greater than the intervention level,
then it is indicated that the speciﬁc protective action is likely to be appropriate
for that situation. Intervention levels are speciﬁc to accident situations.
Operational intervention levels (OIL) are derived from the intervention level (IL)
of avertable dose for speciﬁc countermeasures through site and accident speciﬁc
parameters. Operational intervention levels can be given in any quantity, eg, dose
rate or activity concentration. If the relevant quantity is foreseen to exceed the OIL
in a time period for which the IL has been derived, the speciﬁc countermeasure
should be introduced.
Action levels (AL) refer to diﬀerent protective measures or strategies of pro-
tective measures like agricultural countermeasures or radon reducing measures
in houses. Action levels relate to the residual dose without any remedial actions
taken, i.e., action is taken when the relevant quantity exceeds the action level.
The intervention guidance used in the CIS republics have the character of action
levels expressed as doses above which diﬀerent protective actions would be needed.
For a given exposure situation there would be a ﬁxed ratio of avertable dose to
action level. An action level for resettlement of, say 20 mSv/y, would be equivalent
to an avertable lifetime dose of 150-300 mSv over the following 70 years if the
eﬀective environmental half-life is 5-10 years.
CIS intervention/action levels are thus another way to express avertable doses,
and, conceptually, they are in line with the principles recommended by the in-
ternational organizations. However, the numerical values diﬀer somewhat from
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the international numerical guidance with a tendency of CIS-levels being lower
than the international numerical guidance. Also, there are diﬀerences between the
national guidance in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Decisions on countermeasures include factors describing beneﬁts from the coun-
termeasure and those describing harm. In analyzing the inputs to the decision,
it is necessary to decide on the relative importance of each factor. These judge-
ments have to be made irrespective of the decision aiding technique used. The
resultant decision will be the same provided that the database is the same and
the judgements are consistent.
There has been essentially a broad acceptance internationally of the principles
for intervention. However, it has not been possible to reach agreement for the
purpose of deﬁning a net beneﬁt, on the exact weighting to be attached to each
of the factors inﬂuencing the decision to take a protective action. In any case, the
importance of some of the factors will vary with the site and nature of the accident,
thus making it diﬃcult to generalize. The dominant factors are those related to
radiological protection principles, and to psychological and political factors.
An important aim of protective actions is to reduce the likely numbers of cancers
as much and as eﬀectively as reasonably possible. It seems reasonable that a
national authority should place at least as much eﬀort and resources into avoiding
a radiation induced cancer as it does into avoiding cancers from other causes. If
intervention levels have been set to achieve this, it can be seen that choosing lower
levels would mean allocating more eﬀort and resources to radiation protection
than to other means of health protection, and setting higher levels would mean
allocating less eﬀort and fewer resources to radiation protection.
The residual individual risk of stochastic eﬀects after protective measures have
been taken is often a signiﬁcant concern to national authorities. Such individual
risk considerations can be directly incorporated into the setting of intervention
levels. Alternatively, the national authority can decide to adopt explicit objectives
for individual risk levels whereby they would undertake intervention, if it is justi-
ﬁed, to keep risks of eﬀects below these levels. The basis for setting such objectives
for individual risk levels for intervention would be diﬀerent from that for deriving
dose limits for practices.
Most intervention is disruptive to normal social and economic life. Change may
cause anxiety, which can be harmful to health and well-being. However, the ab-
sence of protective measures can also cause anxiety, which is often exacerbated by
a lack of objective information. These eﬀects are non-radiological, are not easily
quantiﬁable, will vary markedly between countries, and in any case will normally
have opposing inﬂuences on the choice of intervention levels. These considerations
complicate decisions on intervention, which should generally involve other persons
as well as radiation protection specialists.
The basic principles for radiological protection in intervention situations after
nuclear or radiological accidents are based on the concepts of optimized interven-
tion levels of avertable dose for speciﬁc countermeasures to mitigate the conse-
quences of the accident. These principles are generally clear and logical but they
need to be detailed explained in every post-accident situation [6] and [37].
Being necessary and suﬃcient in the earlier phases of an accidental situation
they meet obstacles in their realization in the later phases of the post-accident
situation. Especially non-radiological protection factors (eg psychological factors)
need to be addressed in order to make an optimized overall health protection of
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the aﬀected population. The inclusion of non-radiological protection factors in
an overall optimization of health protection after an accident is a discipline for
decision maker(s) with guidance from radiation protection experts as well as ex-
perts in the ﬁelds of social and psychological sciences. Post-accident management
is therefore not a radiological protection problem only.
The socio-psychological factors are important and they may even be the dom-
inating ones. Social-psychological countermeasures are a new category of action,
in the sense that social protection philosophy has not yet been developed to fully
include their application after a nuclear accident. From the experience in CIS fol-
lowing the Chernobyl accident, the need for social-psychological countermeasures
was obvious.
To achieve optimized countermeasure strategies public understanding and sup-
port is needed. It is crucial to have a complete understanding of the protective
measures in the aﬀected population to achieve a maximum eﬀect of the introduced
countermeasures. If this is sacriﬁced for political conjuncture it may lead to seri-
ous complications in the future. A detailed legislation and regulation basis is thus
very important for post-accident management. It gives a solid base for assured
actions to all participating bodies. New regulation being introduced after an ac-
cident may create social distortion and distrust to the responsible authorities as
was experienced in the former USSR after the Chernobyl accident.
Time scale is another important factor. Transition from post-accident period to
normal life is complicated due to socio-psychological diﬃculty to accept residual
eﬀects. It is very important for public understanding and acceptance that the end
of the post-accident phase is clearly deﬁned as being “normal”, even if the radi-
ological situation is diﬀerent from the pre-accident situation. Natural variations
(regional, global) of “normal” situations could here be used as terms of reference.
The basic intervention philosophy in the three republics have been under con-
stant evolution since the Chernobyl accident. At present, the diﬀerent concepts
being developed include - in addition to radiation protection factors - social pro-
tection considerations. The development also includes a suggestion to unify the
systems of radiation protection for interventions and practices.
In Russia, new basic recommendations applicable to the existing contaminated
territories and possible future accidental situations are being developed to include
all experience on liquidation of the consequences of nuclear accidents and nuclear
weapons tests. The guidance will be based on both radiation and non-radiation
risks and will be expressed in intervention levels in terms of General Intervention
Levels (projected doses) establishing strategies of intervention, Speciﬁed Interven-
tion Levels (avertable doses or risks) for radiation protection purposes, and Spec-
iﬁed Intervention Levels (residual doses or risks) for social protection purposes.
In Ukraine, annual dose levels of 1, 5 and 20 mSv are considered as the inter-
national levels for the whole Ukrainian territory. The protective actions related
to these three levels are no special protective actions below 1 mSv, radiological
control in territories where the annual doses are 1-5 mSv, eﬀective protective ac-
tions where the annual doses are in the range of 5-20 mSv, and the possibility of
resettlement if the annual doses would exceed 20 mSv.
In Belarus, a concept of protective measures is being developed. According
to this concept, living conditions and economic activities should not be limited
in territories where the annual individual eﬀective doses are less than 1 mSv.
In territories where annual doses exceed 1 mSv but are lower than 5 mSv, well-
grounded activities aimed at further reduction of individual and collective doses
should be implemented. In territories where the annual individual eﬀective doses
exceed 5 mSv, residing would not be recommended and economic activities would
be limited.
CIS intervention/action levels as being developed are conceptually in line with
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the principles recommended by the international organizations However, the nu-
merical CIS-levels being somewhat lower than the international numerical guid-
ance. Also, there are diﬀerences between the national guidance in Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus. Harmonization of intervention levels would be of utmost importance
in the context of gaining public conﬁdence.
The eﬀect of diﬀerent countermeasures and the radiological consequences of liv-
ing in contaminated areas can be expressed in terms of avertable risk and residual
risk, both at the individual and the collective level. This way of communicating
the overall situation might be a more direct and understandable way than us-
ing radiological quantities. The development of methodology on risk analysis and
risk communication in the framework of intervention should therefore have a high
priority.
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A Risk assessment methodology and its
application to accidental situations
Vladimir F. Demin
A.1 Needs in Risk Assessment
The decisions on the introduction of post-accident oﬀ-site protection and restora-
tion measures can be made with allowance for only radiological consequences using
the so-called dose approach.
Regulatory documents adopted by international and national organizations, eg,
[5], [14], [21], [28], [29], [39] and [45], respectively, at diﬀerent times, including the
recent years, institute dose intervention levels.
The radiation doses to the population are determined by direct measurements
or calculated. Comparing the estimated doses with the dose intervention levels,
decisions on the radiation or social protection can be made.
In this case and for assessment of radiation accident consequences the concept
of the eﬀective dose, E, is often used ﬁrst of all in the practice in the former Soviet
Union and CIS after the Chernobyl accident.
This concept was developed and suggested by ICRP in 1977 [22]. Later it was
developed and reﬁned in ICRP Publication 60 [28].
As it follows from the experience in the assessment and analysis of the con-
sequences of nuclear accidents or nuclear weapon tests as well as in the imple-
mentation of the protection and restoration measures, there are some reasons, on
the one hand, to go beyond the scope of the radiation protection and to include
non-radiation risks as well. On the other hand, remaining in the framework of the
radiation protection, it is not enough to base oneself on the concept of the eﬀective
dose, even though only the stochastic eﬀects due to the exposure are considered.
A.1.1 Using the concept of eﬀective dose
The eﬀective dose, E, is actually a risk index. The weighting (by diﬀerent organs
of the human body) factors that determine the eﬀective dose are calculated from
the values of the radiological risk. The change-over from E to the values of risk is
performed, if necessary, by simple multiplication of E by the corresponding risk
coeﬃcients.
However, there are some features of the eﬀective dose which limit its use in the
case under consideration (nuclear accidents and nuclear weapon tests). The value
of risk determined by E is:
• integrated over the whole duration of the radiobiological stochastic eﬀect after
an exposure (tens of years for carcinogenesis and all generations to come for
genetic consequences of the exposure);
• averaged over the time period at exposure and over the population of diﬀerent
countries.
As a result, assessment of the radiological health consequences based on eﬀective
dose, E, does not involve the time factor. No data on the radiological risk can
be obtained for the diﬀerent intervals of time after a nuclear accident or test.
The eﬀective dose does not distinguish a great diﬀerence in time between the
occurrences of leukaemia and some “solid” cancers (see below). Besides, the value
of E cannot make allowance for the local and age features of population cohorts
(or personnel) for which the late radiation induced health eﬀects are estimated.
All these points are the critics of non-proper use of the eﬀective dose but not
the concept itself. One should note that the eﬀective dose was developed and rec-
ommended mainly for use in radiation protection in normal conditions (practices).
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A.1.2 Non-radiation risks
The necessity of estimating non-radiation risks is due to the following:
• some countermeasures being implemented can have detrimental side conse-
quences of a non-radiological nature for a population; for example, the re-
location, as follows from the experience available, may adversely aﬀect the
human health because of changing the social and other living conditions;
• note the eﬀect of so-called competition of risks; this eﬀect results essentially
in the mutual inﬂuence of diﬀerent risk factors even though initially they are
statistically independent;
• some possible problems with the health of the population caused by local
or national-wide social living conditions requires, in the context of the most
eﬃcient use of resources in health protection, an assessment in a uniﬁed way
- through a risk analysis - the state of health as a whole and the background
radiation and non-radiation risk factors;
• taking into account the acute, at all times, need for the socio-psychological
substantiation of the countermeasures (interaction with the local population,
authorities and mass media), a substantiated scientiﬁc-methodical basis must
be available to perform the comparative assessments and analysis of various
risks;
• as follows from the present-day methodology of estimating the radiological
risk, the background values of carcinogenic risk must be known for the appli-
cation of this methodology (models of relative risk).
A.1.3 Recent developments
As can be seen from the points listed above, assessment of consequences of nuclear
accidents or tests and decision making on mitigating their health risks, requires
methods on risk assessments from various radiation and non-radiation risk sources
to be developed and used. This is one of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl
accident.
Understanding of these necessities increases in CIS and among the participants
of the JSP 2. In Russia some steps have already been taken in the development of
the respective scientiﬁc basis and regulation. In 1995 the new regulation document
was developed for social protection of the population of the Altai region using the
recommendations from the risk assessments [13]
In the frame of the Belarus and Russia state research program (Chernobyl and
Altai case studies) and the international (EU-CIS) project JSP 2 the research
sub-project “developing the methodology (MAR) and data bank (BARD) on risk
analysis” started in 1994. The ﬁrst version of MAR was published in [11].
The main functions of BARD [5] are:
• assessment of the radiological and non-radiological consequences of nuclear
tests and accidents,
• assessment of the health of a population in terms of risk indices,
• analysis of eﬀectiveness of radiation and social protection measures.
In addition, BARD can also be used for other tasks related to risk analysis. One
version of BARD is developed as a module for a decision aiding computer system
for a post-accident management. BARD includes:
• service and calculation codes realizing the methodology mentioned,
• health-demographic data which are necessary for radiological and non-
radiological risks assessment.
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BARD is to a certain extent similar to the computer codes ASQRAD [2] and
SPIDER [38] developed by CEPN (France) and NRPB (UK). BARD diﬀers from
the latter two by the large intrinsic health demographical data (HDD) base, the
possibility of calculating non-radiological risks, some areas of application etc.
One should note that in Russia the additional development of regulation docu-
ments for post-accident activities based on risk assessment results began in 1995.
In this part of the report only the methodology of risk analysis is considered.
A.2 General methodology
In risk analysis and medical demography many diﬀerent basic and derivative risk
indices and quantities are used, depending on the concrete task.
Here a qualitative and quantitative deﬁnitions are given for some risk indices,
which are essential in the applications considered. There are many publications
concerning the methodology of risk and medical demography analysis, eg, [7], [8],
[26], [28], [33] and [42].
First of all the basic (fundamental) quantities in risk or health demography
analysis are deﬁned. They are the age-speciﬁc death rate, the survival function
and the life expectancy.
A.2.1 Basic quantities
Age-speciﬁc death rate. The age-speciﬁc death rate, m(a), is deﬁned as the
probability density (or probability per unit of time) for death at age a for a per-
son, who is alive up to the age a. This quantity has some other names including
the conditional risk rate, the force of mortality or simply the mortality rate. If
m(a) refers to death from a speciﬁc cause i it is named the age-cause-speciﬁc
death rate and denoted as mi(a).
Survival function. The survival function H(a) is deﬁned as the probability that
an individual would reach the age a (beginning from the birth) and calculated by
the formula:
H(a) = exp
(
−
∫ a
0
m(a′) da′
)
(A.1)
For a person of age a, the probability, H(a, t), of being alive t years more can be
calculated as:
H(a, t) =
H(a + t)
H(a)
(A.2)
Life expectancy The total life expectancy T (from the birth) is calculated as:
T =
∫ ∞
0
H(t) dt. (A.3)
Similarly the life expectancy T (a) for a person with age a is:
T (a) =
∫ ∞
0
H(a, t′) dt′, (A.4)
Note that T = T (0) and T (a) > T − a. It is not unusual to meet the simpliﬁed,
incorrect notion that T (a) = T − a.
A.2.2 Risk indices
Lifetime risk. The lifetime risk Ri is deﬁned as a probability of death from the
ith death cause (or in other words the risk source) during the whole future life
and calculated by the formula:
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Ri =
∫ ∞
0
H(t)mi(t) dt, (A.5)
where H(t) and mi(t) are deﬁned above. Note that the normalization condition:∑
i
Ri = 1 (A.6)
(with the summation over all death causes) can be used in the calculation to prove
its accuracy.
The lifetime risk, Ri(a), for a person at age a can be calculated similarly:
Ri =
∫ ∞
0
H(a, t′)mi(a + t′) dt′ (A.7)
Death risk rate ri(a, t) for a person at age a as a function of time t is given as:
ri(a, t) = H(a, t)mi(a + t) (A.8)
The quantities mi and ri are often called the conditional and the unconditional
risk rates (or probability densities), respectively.
In general mi(t) can depend on other parameters. It will be speciﬁed under
consideration of concrete tasks and death causes.
Similarly to Eq. (A.7) and Eq. (A.8) a lifetime disease risk Rdi(a) and disease
risk rate rdi(a, t) can be deﬁned as:
rdi(a, t) = H(a, t)mdi(a + t) (A.9)
where mdi(a) is the age-cause-speciﬁc disease rate. The value of Rdi(a) can obvi-
ously be greater than 1.
Detriment to human health. The detriment Gi to human health due to some
ith death cause is deﬁned as a loss of life expectancy in man-years (or man-days)
caused by the action of the given source and calculated by:
Gi =
∫ ∞
0
(
H(i)(a)−H(a)
)
da, (A.10)
where:
• H(a) is the total survival function,
• H(i)(a) is the survival function in the absence of the ith death cause.
Taking into account that:
H(a) = H(i)(a) ·Hi(a), (A.11)
where Hi(a) is the survival function under the action of the ith source alone, Eq.
(A.9) can be rewritten as follows:
Gi =
∫ ∞
0
H(i)(a) · H˜i(a) da, (A.12)
H˜i(a) = 1−Hi(a) is the probability of dying at the age a from the action of the
ith death cause alone.
For a person having reached the age e, the detriment Gi(e) is calculated through
the functions H(e, a) and H(i)(e, a):
Gi(e) =
∫ ∞
e
(
H(i)(e, a)−H(e, a)
)
da. (A.13)
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It is useful to deﬁne Gi(e) equivalent to the above deﬁnition:
Gi(e) =
∫ ∞
e
ri(e, a)T (a) da (A.14)
where T (a) is deﬁned above (life expectancy at age a). A similar formula can be
written for detriment caused by morbidity:
Gdi(e) =
∫ ∞
e
rdi(e, a)Tdi da (A.15)
Here Gdi(e) is the mathematical expectation of the duration of diseases caused by
a risk source i during all life time after age e, and Tdi(a) is the average duration
of a disease at age a.
A.2.3 Risk indices on the population level
Above, the main risk indices referred to one person are deﬁned. Usually they are
named individual risk indices. Taking into account the probabilistic (stochastic)
nature of risk it would be reasonable to call them risk indices on the cohort level
when a cohort of people with deﬁnite descriptions (on an age, sex, local conditions
etc.) is considered.
Here formulas for the risk indices on the population level are given. They are
derivative from the main indices considered above. Let a population with an age
composition described by an age distribution density be n(a). The total amount
of people, N , in this population is then equal to:
N =
∞∫
0
n(a) da. (A.16)
The death rate on the population level or in other words an annual mortality
M˙i(t) from an i-th risk source is then calculated as follows:
M˙i(t) =
∞∫
0
n(a)ri(a, t) da. (A.17)
If the integration is for a limited time interval, eg, from a1 to a1+Δa, the mortality
for an separate age group can be calculated as:
M˙i(a1, Δa, t) =
a1+Δa∫
a1
n(a)ri(a, t) da. (A.18)
The total number Mi of excess death cases due to a risk source considered is given
by:
Mi =
∞∫
0
M˙(t) dt. (A.19)
On the population level the so-called standardized death indices msi are often used.
They are deﬁned in the following way:
msi =
∞∫
0
ns(a)mi(a) da, (A.20)
where ns(a) is an age distribution density for the standard population.
More details about this and other risk indices used in the medical demography
can be found, eg, in [33]. As a rule, all risk indices on the population level are
normalized to 100,000 people, i.e. the quantity M˙i(t) from Eq. (A.14) should in
this case be multiplied by 100, 000/N .
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A.2.4 Basic data
As can be seen from the above deﬁnitions and formulas, to assess risk in diﬀerent
indices it is necessary to know initial age-speciﬁc mortality rates for a cohort
under consideration, or, in other words, “background” health-demographical data
(HDD, see above the functions m(t) and mi(t)). The term basic, or “background”,
is related to the state of the health of the population before (or without allowance
for) the action of an additional death cause under consideration.
HDD should include additionally to the functions m and mi values of the age
density distribution for populations considered. The HDD represent a basic body
of initial data for risk assessment. Depending on the application the basic data
must be known in speciﬁed details.
The overall values of m(t), i.e. the sum of all background death causes, must
always be known. It is enough in some cases. To assess the radiological risk using
the present-day approach the background values of HDD for malignant tumors
of diﬀerent localization must be additionally available. Bearing in mind the main
application of the techniques developed in this work and the BARD, namely, the
population in the territories suﬀered from nuclear accidents or nuclear weapon
tests, it is necessary to know the HDD for respective populations in diﬀerent
years.
Two types of HDD are distinguished: current and cohort (HDD of a real gener-
ation) one’s. HDD of the ﬁrst type are used as a rule in the risk analysis. They are
derived on the basis of one-time cross-section of age speciﬁc mortality data [33].
Indeed, such HDD have been prepared in the data base of BARD. Consequently it
is assumed that during all time intervals in which the risk analysis is made HDD
do not change essentially. In the areas of BARD applications this is not strictly
so, and changing the current HDD by cohort one’s or some modiﬁcation of the
former should be additionally studied.
In many HDD all mortality for ages after 85 (or sometimes 75) years are com-
bined in one group with a constant value of age speciﬁc mortality coeﬃcients. For
some tasks more realistic HDD for large ages would be desirable. Observation of
the methods of a reasonable interpolation of HDD to ages a > 85 (or 75) years
can be found, eg, in [33].
A.2.5 Risk competition
The values of the respective risk indices for two or several independent death
causes are usually considered in the simpliﬁed approach of risk assessment to be
simply summed to yield the overall eﬀect (the additive property). This property
seems usually to be evident and have no need of any proofs.
The risk indices R and G are not, in fact, additive, no matter whether the
death causes considered are dependent or independent. The risks can be summed
only in the case when they are low with appropriate assumptions under proper
conditions. A man dies only once. This manifests itself in the fact that the total
lifetime risk is equal to unity (see Eq. (A.6)). A change in one of the death causes
automatically leads to a change (renormalization) in the lifetime risk indices of
other sources in action, even though they are statistically independent. Consider
some two independent death causes characterizing the respective lifetime risks R1
and R2. If one of these (R1) is reduced, the other (R2) would increase and vice
versa. Similar changes would occur in the detriment indices G1 and G2. The term
“risk competition” is sometimes used to describe this property.
It can also be seen qualitatively from the corresponding formulas for the risk
indices R and G. The same can be easily demonstrated by referring directly to
the BARD.
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A.2.6 Mortality and morbidity
The mortality alone was considered in all the quantitative deﬁnitions of risk in-
dices above. It is clear that morbidity must be taken into account for a complete
assessment of risk. This issue has not been considered at the given stage of work.
Only simple formulas are given above, others can be found, eg, in [42]. At this
stage for radiological risk use can be made of the corrections suggested by ICRP
[28] or UNSCEAR [42].
A.3 Risk indices for exposure to ionizing radiation
In this report the term “radiation risk” implies a probability of occurrence of
carcinogenic and genetic eﬀects due to the radiation exposure to an individual.
These are related to the so-called stochastic eﬀects of ionizing radiations. No
consideration is given here to non-stochastic eﬀects at high doses. To estimate
and analyze the radiation risk, use is made of the same indices as in the general
risk analysis: the individual risk R and the detriment G.
The risk index R is used in several modiﬁcations:
• an excess lifetime risk (Rel),
• a lifetime risk (Rdl) due to an exposure to radiation,
• a risk intensity, i.e. a change in risk per unit time, as a rule per year; the last
quantity exists in two versions: rel and rdl corresponding to the quantities
Rel and Rdl, respectively.
A.3.1 Single short-term exposure
The quantity Rel expresses an increase in the lifetime risk from radiation-induced
cancer of the type under consideration:
Rel(e,D) =
∫ ∞
e
[γ(e, a, D) ·H(e, a, D)− γ0(a) ·H(e, a)] da, (A.21)
where:
• γ0(a) is the age-speciﬁc background risk of death due to a speciﬁc spontaneous
cancer,
• H(e, a) is the survival function, i.e. the conditional probability of reaching the
age a for an individual at age e (reached in the absence of the given radiation
exposure),
• γ(e, a,D), H(e, a,D) are respectively the same, but with receiving a single
radiation dose D at the age e.
Here and in the following, D is the equivalent dose to an organ (tissue) of the
human body corresponding to the respective kind of cancer. Elsewhere the pa-
rameter deﬁning the organ of a human body or the respective speciﬁc cancer is
for simplicity omitted.
The principles underlying Rel are rather simple. Two identical groups, one of
which is exposed to the dose D, are formed in a hypothetical experiment. Then
the estimate of Rel for the i-th type of cancer represents the diﬀerence between
the numbers of individuals who have died from the given type of cancer in the
exposed and the unexposed groups.
The feature of the above estimate consists in that the individuals in the exposed
group who have died from the type of cancer considered could die from the same
type of cancer without any exposure to radiation, but much later. Such individ-
uals do not contribute to the estimate of Rel, although the length of their life is
considerably reduced.
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The quantity Rdl represents the lifetime risk for an individual of dying from
cancer induced by radiation. In the case of a single exposure to the dose D at age
e, the estimate of Rdl is expressed as follows:
Rdl(e, D) =
∫ ∞
e
(γ(e, a,D)− γ0(a)) ·H(e, a, D) da. (A.22)
The diﬀerence between the estimates of Rdl and Rel is that for Rdl the mortality
rate from the ith type of cancer in the unexposed group is multiplied by the sur-
vival function for the exposed group. This corresponds to the standard procedure
of assessing the cohorts when comparing the number of deaths with the expected
number in the absence of the risk sources considered.
It should be noted that for any exposure scenario the result of estimation of Rdl
is higher than that of Rel by a factor roughly equal to unity plus the lifetime risk
of death from the given type of cancer.
This factor is, strictly speaking, dose-independent and does not approach zero
in the zero-dose limit. Thus, for all types of cancer the diﬀerence will be about
20%, and the estimates of Rel and Rdl can be considered as interchangeable.
The risk intensities rel and rdl are calculated by the formulas:
rel(e, a,D) = γ(e, a,D) ·H(e, a,D)− γ0(a) ·H(e, a), (A.23)
rdl(e, a,D) = Δγ(e, a, D) ·H(e, a,D). (A.24)
where:
Δγ(e, a, D) = γ(e, a, D)− γ0(a), (A.25)
The other risk index, the detriment G(e,D), represents the diﬀerence between
the life expectancy for individuals exposed at the age e and that for unexposed
individuals. It is suggested that in both cases will the individuals reach the age e.
Mathematically this is expressed as follows:
G(e,D) =
∫ ∞
e
(H(e, a)−H(e, a,D)) da. (A.26)
Sometimes the following expression equal to Eq. (A.23) is used for G(e,D):
G(e,D) =
∫ ∞
e
H(e, a,D) ·Δγ(e, a, D) · T (a) da, (A.27)
where T (a) is life expectancy for a person with age a.
The determination of the values of the quantities γ(e, a, D) is the central prob-
lem in the science of radiation carcinogenesis.
The values of these quantities will be named in what follows the primary data
on radiation carcinogenesis.
The model formulas for the calculation of γ(e, a, D) are given below.
A.3.2 Chronic and mixed exposures to radiation
Let a chronic exposure with a dose rate D˙(t) varying, in general, with time t start
for a person at the age e. The chronic exposure is assumed to be a sum of single
exposures: ∫
D˙(t) . . . dt.
As noted above, the total risk expressed by R or G cannot be obtained by simple
summation because of the competition among risks. Only functions m(. . .) and
γ(. . .) possesses the additive property. On this basis, the derivation of the formulas
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for R and G should be started from the derivation of the integral function Δγ
which is denoted as Δγ(e, a, {D˙}):
Δγ(e, a, {D˙}) =
∫ a
e
Δγ(t, a, d) · D˙(t) dt, (A.28)
Δγ(t, a, d) is the age-speciﬁc mortality rate as a result of radiation carcinogenesis
from a single exposure to unit dose d at the age t. ( More correctly it is the
derivative of the function Δγ(t, a, D) on D at its zero value. Due to linearity of
the dose functions at small values of D these expressions are equal).
The overall function γ(e, a, {D˙}) with allowance for the chronic exposure is
equal to:
γ(e, a, {D˙}) = γ0(a) + Δγ(e, a, {D˙}), (A.29)
γ0(a) is the background value. Here and elsewhere the expression {D˙} means the
functional dependence of the quantity on dose rate D˙(t) as in Eq. (A.25).
The risk rate for a chronic exposure is expressed through Eq. (A.25) by analogy
to Eq. (A.21):
rdl(e, a, {D˙}) = Δγ(e, a, {D˙}) ·H(e, a, {D˙}). (A.30)
It is now simple to write the formulas for the risk indices R and G:
Rdl(e, {D˙}) =
∫ ∞
e
Δγ(e, a, {D˙}) ·H(e, a, {D˙}) da, (A.31)
G(e, {D˙}) =
∫ ∞
e
(
H(e, a)−H(e, a, {D˙})
)
da. (A.32)
Inserting the expression (Eq. (A.25)) for Δγ(e, a, {D˙}) into Eq. (A.31) and chang-
ing the order of the integration, another useful formula for Rdl(e, {D˙}) is obtained:
Rdl(e, {D˙}) =
∫ ∞
e
D˙(t)
(∫ ∞
t
H(e, τ, {D˙}) ·Δγ(t, τ, d) dτ
)
dt, (A.33)
The quantity H(e, a, {D˙}) is calculated by Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) using the function
γ(e, a, {D˙}) (Eq. (A.26)) instead of m(t). It should be pointed out that:
• the risk indices are calculated here in the deﬁnition of (dl);
• H(e, τ, {D˙}) is the survival function with a chronic exposure taken into ac-
count.
For a relatively low radiation risk the functions in Eqs. (A.28) and (A.29) can
be replaced by the “background” function H(e, τ). It changes only slightly the
result of the calculation. As a rule, in most of the radiological risk analyses under
consideration, including that for the Chernobyl, Ural and Altai situations, such an
approximation is applicable. There are no methodical or numerical diﬃculties for
the calculation in any variant (both with an without the given approximation).
If a person is subjected to a mixed radiation exposure (a single exposure at the
age e with dose D0 plus a chronic exposure), the overall function γ(e, a, D0, {D˙})
is determined by the expression as:
γ(e, a, D0, {D˙}) = γ0(a) + Δγ(e, a, D0) + Δγ(e, a, {D˙}). (A.34)
The terms related to the single exposure must be introduced into Eqs. (A.31),
(A.29) and (A.30).
From Eq. (A.33) it appears that a lifetime risk Rdl(e, {D˙}) from a chronic
exposure is not proportional to the so called life time dose. Integration of doses
diﬀerent in time should be done with the correction factor (the expression in the
brackets in Eq. (A.33). This factor depends essentially on time (age) at exposure.
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A.3.3 Speciﬁc areas of application
In the event of an accident to an NPP or other nuclear fuel cycle facility a popu-
lation, depending on the concrete situation, could be subjected only to an acute
(short-term) exposure, if the population is evacuated. In other cases, as a rule, a
mixed (acute plus chronic) exposure of the population will occur. Such a character
of exposure took place in the Kysthym and Chernobyl accidents.
For nuclear weapon tests the doses originated mainly from a single, relatively
short-term exposure or from a sum of such exposures when the impact of two or
more tests were signiﬁcant. This is the situation, for example, for the population
in the Altai territory aﬀected by nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk test
site, eg, [1].
The formulas given above for risk assessment are applicable to all possible cases
of radiation exposure.
One should note here that use must be made of a correction factor DDREF
for radiation risk from LET exposure which takes into account a higher value of
this risk for an “acute” exposure (the exposure with a high dose and dose rate)
as compared with a chronic exposure. ICRP [28] recommends to use DDREF=2
for solid radiogenic cancers and DDREF=1 for leukaemia.
Depending on the formulation of a task there can be many variants of the calcu-
lations concerning the radiological impact of nuclear accidents or nuclear weapon
tests on the population, ranging from epidemiological research to a simple question
about the total expected number of deaths in the cohort under consideration.
Below, additional variants of calculation formulas are given which would be
needed in an assessment of the consequences of radioactive environmental conta-
mination on population health from nuclear weapon tests or accidents (Chernobyl,
Ural, Altai and other cases), as well as for risk management in any post-accidental
situations.
Making risk assessment for the case of the impact of two tests (exposure by doses
D1 and D2 with the time interval Δt between them), the following expression for
the basic function Δγ(. . .) should be used:
Δγ(e, a, Δt, D1, D2) = Δγ(e, a, D1) + Δγ(e + Δt, a, D2). (A.35)
With this function the quantity H(e, a, Δt, D1, D2), and then risk indices R and
G can be calculated.
Other variants of the calculation of the radiation risk at the population level for
some scenarios corresponding to the Chernobyl, Altai, Ural and other situations
can be considered. Let N be the number of people in a given population group
and n(e) the age distribution, where e is the age at the time of an accident or a
nuclear weapons test:
N =
∫ ∞
0
n(e) de. (A.36)
The total number of deaths, M , from malignant tumors due to the exposure within
the given group is then given as:
M =
∫ ∞
0
n(e)R(e, . . .) de, (A.37)
where R(e, . . .) is the lifetime risk of death from radiogenic cancers for a person
with the age e at the moment of a single exposure or at the start of a chronic
exposure. If the lifetime risk in Eq. (A.34) is replaced by the risk rate r(e, . . .),
the rate of death occurrence in the population group (the number of deaths per
unit time (per year)) is obtained:
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M˙(t, . . .) =
∫ ∞
0
n(e)r(e, e + t, . . .) de, (A.38)
Multiplying Eq. (A.35) by 100, 000/N gives the standard, i.e. referring the number
of cases to 100,000 persons. If it is necessary to make calculations for some age
interval, Eq. (A.15) can be used.
Below, Eq. (A.35) is applied to some concrete scenarios of the radiation expo-
sure.
Scenario 1 A single exposure to a dose D at the time t = 0.
This scenario corresponds to the Altai situation. In this case Eq. (A.24) should
be used for the risk rate r(. . .). Introducing Eq. (A.24) into Eq. (A.35) gives the
following result:
M˙(t, D) =
∫ ∞
0
n(e)Δγ(e, e + t, D) ·H(e, e + t, D) de. (A.39)
Scenario 2 Two exposures to single doses D1 and D2 with the time interval Δt
between the exposures.
This scenario is also related to the Altai situation: there are individual settlements
or areas which were essentially aﬀected by the ﬁrst weapon test (in 1949) and one
of the subsequent tests on the Semipalatinsk test site.
The calculation of the individual risk indices for such a scenario was considered
above. Two diﬀerent cohorts of people must be distinguished when calculating the
individual risk indices: the ﬁrst cohort received both doses D1 and D2; the second
cohort (people born or arrived in the given area within the time interval between
the tests) received only the dose D2. The formulas for such a calculation are given
above (Eqs. (A.19), (A.25) and (A.32).
The same diﬀerence must also be taken into account in calculating the number
of deaths per year M˙(t, . . .). Accordingly, the symbols M12(t, Δt, D1, D2) for the
ﬁrst cohort and M2(t, Δt, D2) for the second one are introduced. The total value
M˙s(t, . . .) is equal to:
M˙s(t, . . .) = M˙12(t,Δt, D1, D2) + M˙2(t,Δt, D2). (A.40)
The ﬁrst quantity is calculated by Eq. (A.34) with the function Δγ(. . .) for the
double exposure, see Eq. (A.32). The expression for the second function should be
written separately:
M˙2(t,Δt, D2) =
∫ Δt
0
n(e)Δγ(e, e+ t−Δt, D2) ·H(e, e+ t−Δt, D2) de. (A.41)
Here the integration is made only over those among the population who were
born between the two tests. The method for taking the migration into account is
considered below.
For the condition of a stationary population (an amount and age distribution
change little on a time interval considered) one can use the following approximation
in the calculation of M˙s(t, . . .) for the case of two tests impact:
M˙s(t, . . .) ≈ M˙(t, D1) + M˙(t−Δt, D2). (A.42)
Here M˙(t, D) corresponds to a single exposure to dose D. It is easily understand-
able that for the conditions considered, this expression is a good approximation
for assessing Ms(t, . . .) for the case of two tests impact: their mutual inﬂuence on
a population level can as a rule be neglected.
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Scenario 3 An acute exposure to a dose D0 and a subsequent chronic exposure
with a time-dependent dose rate D˙(t).
This scenario reﬂects the situations in the territories aﬀected by the Kysthym
and Chernobyl accidents. In this case the value of M˙(t, . . .) is calculated by the
formula:
M˙(t, D0, {D˙}) =
∫ ∞
0
n(e){r(e, e + t, D0) + r(e, e + t, {D˙})} de
+
∫ t
0
nb(τ)r(0, t− τ, {D˙}) dτ (A.43)
The risk rates r(. . .) are deﬁned above (see Eqs. (A.24) and (A.27)); nb(τ) is the
birth rate in the given population group (number of births per year) as a function
of the current time τ .
If necessary, the migration is taken into account as described below. Here as
elsewhere it is assumed for simplicity that D is a whole-body dose. It is suﬃciently
simple to extend to the case of a nonuniform exposure.
For a stationary population one can use an approximate formula like it is done
for the case of two-fold exposure (Eq. (A.39)):
M˙(t, D0, {D˙}) ≈ M˙(t, D0) +
∫ t
0
M˙ (t− τ, d(τ)) · D˙(τ) dτ} (A.44)
where d(τ) in the dose unit at time τ , and M˙(. . .) is deﬁned as in Eq. (A.25). If
necessary, a migration is taken into account as described below.
Consideration of a possible migration of population
In the speciﬁcation of a task within a given scenario it may be necessary to allow
for the migration of the population. In any scenario, departing people decrease the
risk in the local population, because they carry away both possible future cancer
cases and the other risks. The newly arrived people can make contribution to the
risk considered if they receive the second dose (scenario 2) or appear in a zone of
a chronic exposure (scenario 3). Allowance for the migration must be made with
care: “the competition between risks” applies also to the migration. The role of
this competition in the risk analysis was discussed above.
First of all a method of making allowance for the migration (departure) of the
population which practically refers similarly to all scenarios considered above is
described. Let mM (e, e + t) be the age-speciﬁc migration (departure) coeﬃcient
or, in other words, the density of probability that an individual who was at the
age e at the moment of the exposure will depart in t years. The migration can be
considered like a mortality (leaving) within the given cohort (population group).
As a consequence, in the calculation formulas for M(t, . . .) using the survival
function H(e, e+ t, . . .) one should multiply this function by a factor which prop-
erly takes into account the migration:
Hm (e, e + t) = exp
(
−
∫ e+t
e
mm (e, a′) da′
)
. (A.45)
The migration - arrival of people on a radioactive contaminated territory for living
- can be taken into account as indicated above making allowance for children being
born (Eq. (A.41)). The only diﬀerence is that people appear (as if they are born)
at any age but not at age e = 0. In this case instead of quantity nb(τ) one should
use n(e, τ) which is an age distribution of migration (arrival) rate at time τ and
add the integration through the age at the time of arrival.
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A.4 Models of radiation risk (carcinogenesis)
The exact and complete theory of the radiation carcinogenesis (RC) is absent. In
such circumstances, phenomenological models of RC (models describing the age
speciﬁc risk γ(e, a, D)) are used in the radiation risk assessment. These models
have been produced using results of epidemiological studies and radiobiological
experiments.
A.4.1 Models of absolute and relative risks
All models developed and recommended by the competent international and na-
tional organizations for radiation risk assessment belongs to one of the following
two types (from view-point of their relation with spontaneous cancer risk):
• a model of absolute (or additive) risk,
• a model of relative (or multiplicative) risk.
In the general form they are written as the following:
(A) Absolute (or additive)
γ(e, a, D) = γ0(a) + habs(e, a) · fabs(D), (A.46)
(B) Relative (or multiplicative)
γ(e, a, D) = γ0(a) · (1 + gr(e, a) · fr(D)). (A.47)
Here the age-speciﬁc background death rate due to a speciﬁc cancer, γ0(a), is
deﬁned above; gabs(e, a), gr(e, a) are factors allowed to depend on age at time of
exposure, time, etc.; fabs(D) and fr(D) are functions of dose D. Here as elsewhere
the parameter denoting a speciﬁc cancer is omitted.
The radiation risk estimations in ICRP Publication 27 [23] were made using the
absolute risk models. In ICRP Publication 45 [26], estimations by the relative risk
models were added.
Not addressing the further history of developing and using these models it should
be noted that the relative risk models now are more preferable for the most ra-
diogenic cancer estimates.
A.4.2 Sets of radiation risk models
At present there are few sets of radiation risk models developed by the interna-
tional and national competent organizations: models from UNSCEAR 88 [42] and
UNSCEAR 94 [43], BEIR V [44], UK NRPB [38] etc., all using absolute and rel-
ative risks. The diﬀerences between them come from diﬀerent grouping of human
body organs in choosing the concrete models and from diﬀerent accounting for
dependence of the radiation cancer risk on age at exposure and time.
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B Clean-up of radioactively contami-
nated land
Per Hedemann Jensen
B.1 Introduction
Clean-up of a contaminated territory would be based on dose reduction and cost
associated with the clean-up. Action levels for clean-up based on avertable individ-
ual doses are levels above which clean-up is undertaken and below which it is not.
An optimized action level for clean-up would correspond to the level of avertable
dose at which the marginal increase in avertable dose become just less valuable
than the increased marginal cost. The action level for clean-up can thus be de-
ﬁned as the lowest level at which clean-up to reduce doses is justiﬁed. In other
words, the action level corresponds to the maximum acceptable level of residual
dose attributable to the contamination without clean-up. This Section provides a
simple example of how a generic dose level for justiﬁed clean-up of contaminated
areas might be determined.
B.2 Urban and semi-urban areas
The optimum intervention criteria for clean-up operations would depend on many
factors. The most important factors are the avertable individual doses to the pop-
ulation, ΔEind, the eﬃciency of the decontamination (fraction of activity remain-
ing), η, and the monetary costs of the cleaning operation, cclean. The clean-up
costs, cclean, can be expressed as:
cclean = cwastew + clabε + cequipδ (B.1)
where cwaste is the cost per unit mass of produced waste, w is the waste produced
per unit area, clab is the labor cost per unit time, ε is the working time spent
per unit area, cequip is the equipment cost per unit time, and δ is the time of
equipment use per unit area. The parameters w, ε, and δ, would all depend on
the clean-up eﬃciency, η.
The clean-up costs would depend on the type of area contaminated as the clean-
up procedures would be diﬀerent for the diﬀerent areas. Clean-up of urban areas
would include street sweeping, ﬁrehosing, asphalt planing, removal of vegetation
and removal of soil. Clean-up of agricultural areas would include removal of soil
and removal of vegetation. Clean-up of forest areas would include removal of trees,
removal of under-vegetation and removal of soil.
The clean-up costs would involve the disposal of waste which could be the
dominating cost in the clean-up of large areas. Removal of the upper one centimeter
of soil in an area of 1 km2 would create 10,000 m3 of soil waste with a cost
of disposal of the order of $ 106 per km2. For an urban area with the same
characteristics as the city of Copenhagen the costs of clean-up, cclean, have been
estimated to the values shown in Table B1, based on the Nordic research program
on waste and decommissioning (KAN-Programme).1
1Cleanup of Large Radioactive Contaminated Areas and Disposal of Generated Waste. Final
Report of the KAN2 Project, TemaNord 1994:567, February 1994
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Table B1. Costs for diﬀerent clean-up methods in an area of 250 km2 of a city
with the characteristics of Copenhagen.
Clean-up Clean-up costs ($·km−2)
method Clean-up Transporta) Wagesc)
Soil removal 400,000-800,000 b) - 100,000-200,000
Grass cutting 5,000-10,000 2,000-5,000 5,000-10,000
Firehosing 5,000-15,000 1,000-4,000 5,000-10,000
Asphalt planing 600,000-1,000,000 40,000-80,00 70,000-150,000
a) Transport of waste
b) Includes transport of waste
c) Based on Western countries with a salary of $ 15 per hour
Taking into consideration only the avertable dose to the population, the doses to
the workers engaged in the clean-up and the monetary costs of the cleaning oper-
ation the following factors would enter the optimization process for determining
the intervention level for the clean-up:
• the number of people living in the contaminated area, Npop
• the size of the contaminated area, A
• the monetary cost of the clean-up per unit area, cclean
• the number of workers carrying out the clean-up, Nwork
• the collective dose to the clean-up personnel, Swork = Ework Nwork
• the eﬃciency of the clean-up operation (fraction of activity removed), η
• the reduction factor of dose rate, f(= 1/(1− η))
• the monetary cost of relocation per person and unit time, crel
• the equivalent monetary cost of the unit collective dose, α
In the optimisation of intervention levels for clean-up two diﬀerent situations will
be considered. Firstly, a contaminated residential area from which people have
not been relocated, and, secondly, a contaminated residential area from which
people have been relocated because the avertable doses by relocation exceed the
intervention level.
B.2.1 Areas from which people have not been relocated
The condition for a clean-up operation to be justiﬁed is that the monetary value
of the avertable collective dose, ΔS, from the clean-up is larger than the sum of
the monetary value of the collective dose to the clean-up workers and the cost of
the clean-up operation:
αΔS ≥ αEworkNwork + ccleanA ≈ ccleanA (B.2)
The cost of the collective dose the clean-up workers will normally be marginal
compared to the other clean-up costs and therefore the ﬁrst term in the above
equation can be disregarded.
The annual dose, Ean, from activity deposited in urban and semi-urban envi-
ronments will, as an approximation, be proportional to the surface contamination
density at each surface type. The annual dose would thus be:
Ean ∝ xsoilvsoil + xgrassvgrass + xhousevhouse + xasphaltvasphalt (B.3)
where:
• x is the fraction of the given surface type, and
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• v is the relative deposition velocity for that surface type.
When the clean-up eﬃciency for the diﬀerent surfaces is ηi, which deﬁnes the
reduction factor, fi, as 1/(1 - ηi), the annual dose after clean-up, Ean,clean, can
be described as:
Ean,clean ∝ (1− ηsoil)xsoilvsoil (B.4)
+ (1− ηgrass)xgrassvgrass
+ (1− ηhouse)xhousevhouse
+ (1− ηasphaltxasphaltvasphalt
The eﬀective dose reduction factor, f , by clean-up of the diﬀerent surfaces can
then be described as:
f =
Ean
Ean,clean
=
∑
i xi vi∑
i(1− ηi)xi vi
(B.5)
If T is the time period over which the collective dose is accumulated, the avertable
collective dose, ΔS, over the time, T , is related to the (fairly constant) annual
individual eﬀective dose, Ean, as:
ΔS = Npop
[∫ T
0
Ean(t) dt− 1
f
∫ T
0
Ean(t) dt
]
(B.6)
= Npop
f − 1
f
Ean T
The justiﬁed annual individual eﬀective dose, Ean, before clean-up can be found
from the following considerations. The avertable collective dose over time, T , with
clean-up will determine the justiﬁed value of the annual individual dose before
clean-up, Ean, as:
αΔS = αNpop
f − 1
f
Ean T ≥ ccleanA (B.7)
With a population density Ppop = Npop/A, a dose reduction factor, f , equal to
1/η, the justiﬁed value of the annual eﬀective dose before clean-up, Ean, can then
be found from the above equation to be:
(Ean)just =
(
f
f − 1
)
cclean
αPpop T
(B.8)
Fig. B1 illustrates the eﬀect of a clean-up operation which results in a reduction
of the collective dose by a factor, f .
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Figure B1. Avertable collective dose from clean-up with eﬃciency of the clean-up,
η, which expresses the fraction of the radioactive material removed after clean-up.
Calculations of the justiﬁed annual eﬀective dose, Ean, before clean-up of urban
and semi-urban areas have been made with the program Crystal Ball. For an
assumed clean-up eﬃciency, η, of soil removal, grass cutting, ﬁrehosing of houses
and asphalt planing the total clean-up costs per unit area were calculated as:
cclean = xsoilcclean,soil + xasphaltcclean,asphalt (B.9)
+ xhousecclean,house + xgrasscclean,grass
Assigning distributions to all parameters, a range of justiﬁed values of the annual
individual dose before clean-up has been calculated. The values of the parameters
and the parameter distributions used in the calculations are shown in Table B2.
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Table B2. Parameter values and their distributions used in the optimization cal-
culations.
Uniform Log-normal distribution
Parameter distribution Central Standard
value deviation
Soil removal cost, $ km−2 400,000-800,000 600,000 200,000
Wages, $ km−2 100,000-200,000 150,000 50,000
Grass cutting cost, $ km−2 5,000-10,000 7,500 2,200
Transport, $ km−2 2,000-5,000 3,500 1,000
Wages, $ km−2 5,000-10,000 7,500 2,500
Firehosing cost, $ km−2 5,000-15,000 10,000 3,000
Transport, $ km−2 1,000-4,000 2,500 800
Wages, $ km−2 5,000-10,000 7,500 2,500
Asphalt planing cost, $ km−2 600,000-1,000,000 800,000 300,000
Transport, $ km−2 40,000-80,000 60,000 20,000
Wages, $ km−2 70,000-150,000 110,000 35,000
Pop. dens., km−2 (urban) 300-600 450 200
Pop. dens., km−2 (semi-urban) 100-200 150 60
Rel. deposition roads, vroad 0.2-0.5 0.30 0.08
Rel. deposition houses, vhouse 0.05-0.2 0.12 0.03
Rel. deposition grass, vgrass 0.8-1.2 1.0 0.20
Rel. deposition soil, vsoil 0.8-1.2 1.0 0.20
Fraction houses Urban 0.50 0.50 -
Xhouse Semi-urban 0.30 0.30 -
Fraction roads Urban 0.25 0.25 -
Xroad Semi-urban 0.25 0.25 -
Fraction soil Urban 0.20 0.20 -
Xsoil Semi-urban 0.30 0.30 -
Fraction grass Urban 0.05 0.05 -
Xgrass Semi-urban 0.15 0.15 -
Soil removal eﬃciency, ηsoil 0.5-0.8 0.70 0.14
Grass cutting eﬃciency, ηgrass 0.2-0.6 0.40 0.06
Firehosing eﬃciency, ηhouse 0.1-0.5 0.30 0.03
Asph. plan. eﬃciency, ηasphalt 0.6-0.9 0.80 0.12
Cost of unit dose, α, $ Sv−1 10,000-40,000 25,000 8,000
Integration time, T , years 30-300 200 50
Relocation costs, $month−1 200-500 200 70
The results of the Crystal Ball calculations with the above values and distribu-
tions are shown in Table B3. The reason why the results for semi-urban areas are
approximately four times higher than for urban areas is mainly due to the diﬀer-
ence in population density. For more dense populated areas the avertable dose by
the clean-up operation per unit reduction in dose rate will result in a correspond-
ingly higher avertable collective dose over the period considered.
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Table B3. Annual dose levels, Ean, in mSv/year above which clean-up is justiﬁed
based on avertable dose and monetary costs of the clean-up of urban and semi-
urban areas.
Area type Distribution Percentiles Mean Median
2.5% 50% 97.5%
Urban uniform 0.14 0.43 2.30 0.60 0.40
log-normal 0.10 0.34 1.20 0.40 0.30
Semi-urban uniform 0.49 1.50 7.80 2.20 1.50
log-normal 0.36 1.20 3.90 1.40 1.20
The justiﬁed annual dose level, Ean, before clean-up can be considered as the
actionlevel, AL for introducing clean-up. If the actual dose level, Eact, (from all
relevant exposure pathways) is greater than the AL, clean-up would normally be
justiﬁed.
The residual dose after an optimized clean-up operation can be either lower
or greater than the AL. This will depend on the ratio Eact/AL. If the ratio is
signiﬁcantly higher than the eﬀective dose reduction factor, f , the residual dose
after an optimized clean-up would still be higher than the AL. If the ratio is of
the same order of magnitude or lower than, f , the residual dose would most likely
be lower than the AL.
If the actual dose level is much higher than a few millisieverts per year this
would invoke the temporary countermeasures appropriate for the later phases
of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Where assessed individual doses are in
the region of 10 mSv/y or greater, remediation will almost always be justiﬁed.
Doses of that magnitude, corresponding to a lifetime dose of about 1 Sv, would,
in any case, invoke permanent relocation if the exposure rate is chronic or semi-
chronic. However, the generic justiﬁcation calculations performed in this Appendix
- although of a rather simple nature - seem to indicate that an AL for clean-up in
terms of annual dose before clean-up would fall in the range from a fraction of a
millisievert to a few millisievert per year.
Operational quantities are the parameters actually measured to evaluate or
to demonstrate compliance with a particular cleanup criterion. The action level,
AL, would generally be expressed in dose, eg annual dose. However, for many
practices and for some interventions, these criteria can generally be converted
into more readily measurable operational quantities. Such quantities are derived
by mathematical models where all signiﬁcant exposure pathways and the projected
relevant behaviour of the exposed population group. Some models may only be
suitable and useful for screening, while other models may be suitable for site
speciﬁc application.
B.2.2 Areas from which people have been relocated
The condition for a clean-up operation to be justiﬁed in areas from which people
have been relocated is that the saved relocation costs by the accelerated return
time, Δτ , is larger than the sum of the monetary value of the collective dose to
the clean-up workers and the cost of the clean-up operation itself:
crelNpopΔτ ≥ αEworkNwork + ccleanA (B.10)
where crel is the relocation cost per person and unit time. The dose rate at the
return time is here assumed to be equal in the situations with and without clean-
up. The accelerated return time can be found from the above equation as:
Δτ ∼= cclean
crel
A
Npop
=
cclean
crel
1
Ppop
(B.11)
as the equivalent cost of the doses the workers is only marginal compared to the
clean-up costs, cclean. The value of Δτ can be expressed by the half-life of the
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deposited radionuclides as:
Δτ =
T1/2
ln(2)
ln(f) (B.12)
The justiﬁed value of Δτ can then be expressed by the half-life of the deposited
radionuclides as:
T1/2 =
ln(2)
ln(f)
cclean
Ppop crel
(B.13)
The half-life, T1/2, corresponding to the justiﬁed accelerated return time has
been calculated from Crystal Ball, and the results are shown in Table B4.
It is not justiﬁed to clean areas for half-lives less than the values shown
as the costs from the clean-up will be greater than the saved relocation costs.
It is therefore better to wait for the decay of activity before the area is reinhabited.
Table B4. Half-life of contaminant, T1/2, in months above which clean-up is justi-
ﬁed based on the break-even between clean-up costs and saved relocation costs.
Area type Distribution Percentiles Mean Median
2.5% 50% 97.5%
Urban uniform 1.1 2.1 4.3 2.3 2.1
log-normal 1.1 3.8 12.0 4.5 3.8
Semi-urban uniform 3.8 7.4 15.5 8.0 7.4
log-normal 3.9 13.0 41.0 15.4 13.0
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